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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE 
MASSACHUSETTS LANDFILL MORATORIUM: ARE 
NATIONAL MARKET PRINCIPLES ADEQUATELY 
SERVED? 
Daniel M. Forman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December, 1995, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts announced 
a two-year moratorium on permit approvals for new landfills and the 
expansion of existing landfills.1 According to Trudy Coxe, Secretary 
of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, Massachusetts has 
determined that it does not have a need for more landfill capacity 
because its communities are more than adequately served by existing 
landfill capacity.2 The Commonwealth announced the moratorium in 
order to make this determination clear and to discourage project 
proponents from wasting their time by submitting futile permit ap-
plications.3 However, the moratorium is not an entirely philanthropic 
gesture for the benefit of project proponents and landfill operators. It 
is part of a comprehensive strategy for increasing recycling by mak-
ing it harder for Massachusetts municipalities to rely on landfills as 
their primary means of waste disposa1.4 Although the objectives of 
conserving land and encouraging recycling are clearly valid state 
purposes, the admitted rationale of the moratorium, lack of in-state 
* Production Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 John J. Monahan, State Puts 2-Year Ban on New Landfills, TELEGRAM & GAZETrE (Worces-
ter, MA), Dec. 7, 1995, at A2. 
2Id. 
3 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSE'ITS, MASSACHUSE'ITS SOLID WASTE MASTER PLAN: 
1995 UPDATE 38 (1995) [hereinafter MASTER PLAN]. 
4 Id. at !Hi, 38--39. 
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demand, raises a serious possibility that the measure violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.5 
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme 
Court established that garbage is an article of commerce and that 
states may not prohibit the importation of garbage.6 Recent cases 
have established that flow-control ordinances that require local proc-
essing are analogous to export restrictions and natural resource hoard-
ing and, like import embargoes, also violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.7 Recent cases also have established that states may not regu-
late waste disposal by imposing discriminatory taxes or fees on im-
ported waste.S The Massachusetts permit moratorium is different 
from the regulations challenged in these cases because the morato-
rium does not regulate specific transactions by placing restrictions on 
individual shipments of waste.9 Rather, the Massachusetts scheme 
regulates all landfill operators, those handling exclusively in-state 
waste and those handling out-of-state waste, through the imposition 
of a state-wide cap on landfill capacity and annual disposal tonnage.lO 
Although the scheme is state-neutral with respect to individual trans-
actions, it is not state-neutral with respect to the level of the state-
wide cap.ll The scheme will only consider the forecasted level of 
demand from Massachusetts waste generators when setting the level 
of the cap.12 
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether a 
state-wide cap based on in-state demand is consistent with the dor-
mant Commerce Clause. Three federal district courts have held that 
demonstration of in-state demand is not a permissible requirement 
for the issuance of a waste disposal permit.13 The only circuit courts 
to consider state-wide caps, however, appear to be divided over the 
5 u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power "[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"); Oregon Waste 
Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (noting understanding that 
Commerce Clause has negative aspect that denies states power). 
6 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978). 
7 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994). 
8 See Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99-100; Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 
U.S. 334, 342 (1992). 
9 See MAsTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 38. 
10 See id. 
11 See generally id., ch. 3 (methodology for calculating need for capacity assumes no net 
imports and only considers in-state generators). 
12 [d. at 29-30. 
13 Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1035, 1037-S8 
(D.S.C. 1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir.1996); Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 
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question of whether state-wide caps based exclusively on in-state 
demand discriminate against interstate commerce.I4 
This Comment will review the dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence in general, and the cases dealing with the regulation of natural 
resources in particular. Although the natural resources cases gener-
ally prohibit states from providing preferred access to their residents, 
the cases do not grant an absolute right of access to resources by 
out-of-state residents. Thus, there is some room for arguing that 
states may set some kind of state-wide caps on the exploitation of 
resources such as landfill capacity. The question is whether there are 
limits to the types of state-wide caps that may be imposed and, if so, 
the nature of those limits. This Comment will review a second line of 
dormant Commerce Clause cases, represented by Buck v. Kuyken-
daW5 and H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,16 which deal with regula-
tions based on whether a market is adequately served, the stated 
rationale for the Massachusetts moratorium.I7 These cases provide a 
basis for arguing that while some kind of state-wide cap may be 
permissible, a state-wide cap based on in-state demand should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny under some circumstances.I8 
Section II discusses some of the details of the Massachusetts regu-
latory scheme for solid waste management and landfill permits. Sec-
tion III reviews the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in 
general, and the application of the dormant Commerce Clause to 
natural resources hoarding cases in particular. Section IV discusses 
states' use of the "adequately served" criteria for regulating inter-
state commerce. This section will review cases such as Buck and Hood 
which discuss the requirement of "demonstration of need" outside the 
context of waste disposal, as well as more recent case law involving 
permitting criteria and state-wide caps in the waste disposal arena. 
Section V applies the hoarding doctrine, "demonstration of need" case 
law, and dormant Commerce Clause policies to argue that state-wide 
caps based exclusively upon in-state demand should be considered 
virtually per se invalid. The analysis then evaluates the Massachu-
887 F. Supp. 1534, 1559--63 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina 
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 843 F. Supp. 100, 109 (D.S.C. 1992). 
14 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 787-88 (4th Cir. 
1996); Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir. 1995). 
15 267 U.S. 307 (1925). 
16 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
17 MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 4, 35. 
18 See infra notes 185-217,292-94 and accompanying text. 
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setts moratorium in light of the current case law, the analysis of 
state-wide caps, and the purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
II. MASSACHUSETTS SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Massachusetts is committed to achieving a goal of recycling forty-
six percent of all municipal solid waste by the year 2000.19 The Com-
monwealth views landfills as the least desirable waste management 
technology20 and intends to reduce landfill burial to four percent of 
total waste tonnage.21 Landfills create groundwater pollution and air 
pollution, as well as surface water problems.22 The Commonwealth 
views the "artificial cost advantage" enjoyed by landfill disposal as an 
impediment to the growth of recycling and as a threat to waste-to-en-
ergy facilities and recycling-related manufacturing and processing 
industries.23 Massachusetts has determined that it already has excess 
landfill capacity for its needs.24 "[P]ermitting more [municipal solid 
waste] landfill capacity can only come at the expense of reducing the 
share of the waste stream diverted to recycling and compo sting, or 
increasing waste imports. Both result in negative environmental and 
resource management impacts."25 
The Massachusetts landfill permitting regulations, prior to the an-
nouncement of the moratorium, included evaluation criteria which 
were based upon the "reasonably anticipated disposal capacity re-
quirements and reduction/diversion goals of the Commonwealth and 
the geographic area(s) which the site will serve."26 Although the "geo-
graphic area(s)" language seems to leave room for the Commonwealth 
to consider the capacity requirements of out-of-state generators, the 
Department of Environmental Protection has interpreted this lan-
guage to refer to geographic areas within the state.27 Thus, the crite-
ria for review of permit applications, as defined by the regulations, 
require the Department to consider in-state need as a factor but, 
strictly speaking, do not require the proponent to demonstrate in-
19 MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 11. 
20 See id. at 24. 
21 [d. at 36. 
22 [d. at 37. 
22 [d. 
24 MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 37. 
25 [d. (emphasis added). 
26 MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 19.038(2)(a)(1l) (1994); see also id. § 16.40(5)(a)(I) (1994). 
27 See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 39 (referring to state-wide need). 
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state need.28 In interpreting the regulation, however, the Department 
has implemented a permit process in which each permit approval 
reduces the amount of total state-wide need available for subsequent 
permit applicants.29 The regulation, as implemented, therefore, amounts 
to a state-wide processing cap based exclusively upon in-state de-
mand.30 
In 1994, the Commonwealth announced that it would not grant 
permits for additional municipal solid waste disposal capacity in the 
near term because there was substantial excess capacity.31 Nonethe-
less, public and private developers continued to present applications 
to build new landfills or expand existing landfills.32 The Common-
wealth concluded that allowing the permitting process to remain open 
sent mixed signals to municipal planners that they could continue to 
rely upon landfills as a cheap disposal option.33 The Department of 
Environmental Protection announced a moratorium on most landfill 
permit applications in order to force local officials to reduce their 
communities' dependence on landfills.34 
The Massachusetts Solid Waste Master Plan: 1995 Update (here-
inafter Master Plan) includes forecasts of Massachusetts solid waste 
disposal needs.35 These forecasts assume a growth in the percentage 
of waste composted and recycled from thirty-one percent in 1994 to a 
projected thirty-four percent in 1996 and to forty-six percent in 2000.36 
Although a growth in recycling is described as an assumption,37 the 
Master Plan also recognizes that increased recycling is really a goal 
and that the Commonwealth probably cannot achieve this goal with-
out a forced reduction in the available landfill capacity.38 A further 
assumption behind the forecasts is that the current net imports of 
28 See MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 19.038(2)(a)(1l). 
29 See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 39 ("[T]otal state-wide need for disposal capacity is 
reduced by the number of tons of disposal allowed under the permit.") (emphasis added). 
30 See id. 
3! [d. at 38. 
32 [d. 
33 [d. 
34 MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 35, 38. 
35 [d. at 29-33. 
36 [d. at 3, 30. 
37 [d. at 30. 
38 See id. at 37. Furthermore, the MASTER PLAN states that the reduction in capacity is also 
intended to assist Massachusetts recycling industries which would otherwise be threatened by 
competition from landfill operators. [d. 
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waste, amounting to 3.8% of the total waste stream, will decrease to 
zero.39 The Master Plan does not indicate whether net imports will 
drop as a result of price increases in the remaining available capacity 
or as a result of a reduction in landfills accepting out-of-state waste. 
Nor does the Master Plan discuss the possibility that some of the 
waste that is displaced from landfill disposal will end up being ex-
ported to other states rather than being recycled. The Master Plan 
and the associated regulations establish a regulatory scheme which 
affects interstate commerce by reducing landfill capacity and by re-
ducing net imports of waste to zero.40 These effects clearly implicate 
the dormant Commerce Clause. 
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. General Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution41 as limiting the power of the 
states to discriminate against or burden interstate commerce.42 The 
Court sometimes describes the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause 
in terms of economic development: "every farmer and every craftsman 
shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free 
access to every market in the N ation."43 The Court also expresses these 
goals in terms of concerns that, without some form of restraint, the 
states will enact protectionist laws that will excite "jealousies and retali-
atory measures."44 The concern about retaliation is not merely another 
way of stating the economic development aspiration but embodies an 
additional concern for the integrity of the national political union.45 
The Court has fashioned general statements of principles from 
these goals: 
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone 
has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, 
39 MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 3, 30. 
40 See id. 
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. 
42 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 
43 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). 
44 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Hood, 336 U.S. 
at 539 ("What fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals would ensue if such practices 
were begun!"). 
45 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1113 (1986). 
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including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against 
foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not 
separable economic units .... [O]ne state in its dealings with an-
other may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.46 
431 
The Court has articulated a vision of a national free trade zone in 
which there are no state lines for purposes of trade.47 
The Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence seeks to strike 
a balance between these national market principles and an under-
standing of federalism in which the Commerce Clause was never 
intended to strip the states of the power to regulate local activity, 
even though it is incidentally related to interstate commerce.48 This 
balance is reflected in the Court's two-tiered approach to analyzing 
challenged laws or actions.49 Where the state has been motivated by 
discriminatory purposes or the challenged action discriminates on its 
face or in its practical effect, the action is subject to a "virtually per 
se rule of invalidity."50 The burden falls on the state to show that it is 
pursuing some legitimate purpose that cannot be achieved with a 
nondiscriminatory alternative.51 On the other hand, the so-called Pike 
balancing test states that "[ w ]here a statute regulates evenhandedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits."52 
46 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (quoting Hood, 336 U.S. at 
537-38) (citation omitted). 
47 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1981) ("[T]he borders 
between the States are essentially irrelevant .... '[I]n matters of foreign and interstate com-
merce there are no state lines."') (quoting West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 
(1911». 
48 See Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960). 
49 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 
(1986). 
50 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 
263,270-71 (1984); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 623. 
51 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). Although the "virtually per se" rule is almost 
always fatal, the Court may make an exception for quarantine laws that block interstate 
shipment of noxious articles. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 628. However, the 
courts will require more than a showing that the articles are undesirable; the very movement 
of the articles must represent a threat such that disposal as close to the point of generation as 
possible is required. See id. at 628-29. A legitimate quarantine measure passes heightened 
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny because there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives avail-
able for protecting the state's interest. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 151 (1986). 
52 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
432 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:2 
The Court focuses on the distinction between the concepts of pro-
tectionist discrimination and incidental burden when it decides what 
level of scrutiny to apply to a state action.53 Generally, a statute 
discriminates against interstate commerce only when it confers a 
benefit upon in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-state 
competitors, solely on the basis of their origin.54 For example, the 
mere fact that most of the burden of a tax is born by out-of-state 
interests is not necessarily considered discriminatory so long as the 
burden is not borne according to a distinction between in-state and 
out-of-state consumers.55 
No clear line separates the heightened scrutiny and Pike balancing 
tiers.56 "[FJacial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regard-
less of the State's purpose, because 'the evil of protectionism can 
reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends."'57 However, 
even when a state has acted through a series of measures, each of 
which is individually constitutional, the Court may still examine the 
entire program to determine whether it discriminates in favor of local 
interests.58 The Court will look beyond the form of the measure when 
it decides what level of scrutiny to apply.59 
Protectionist purpose is sufficient to require heightened scrutiny.60 
However, an explicit finding of protectionist purpose is not necessary 
for heightened scrutiny because "the evil of protectionism can reside 
in legislative means as well as legislative ends."61 The Court will look 
beyond the "name, description or characterization" of a measure to 
the "practical impact of the law."62 Even if a state's ultimate aim is 
legitimate, "it may not be accomplished by discriminating against 
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is 
53 See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
54 See Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1256 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992)). 
55 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1978). 
56 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). 
57 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,336 (1979) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978)). 
58 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994). 
59 [d. ("Our Commerce Clause jurisprudence is not so rigid as to be controlled by the form by 
which a State erects barriers to commerce."). 
60 See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,270 (1984). Indeed, Regan has argued that 
almost all dormant Commerce Clause decisions can be explained solely by the presence or 
absence of protectionist purpose. Regan, supra note 45, at 1093. 
61 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978). 
62 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (citing Lacoste v. Louisiana Dep't of Conser-
vation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924)). 
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some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently."63 
The Court has occasionally discussed the difference between the 
two tiers as including a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" 
regulation or effect.64 Professor Donald Regan, in his 1985 article, 
defined the "modern era of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence" 
in terms of the rejection of the "direct/indirect" distinction during the 
1930's and 1940'S.65 Professor Regan cites Justice Stone's dissent in Di 
Santo v. Pennsylvania,66 Professor Noel Dowling's 1940 Virginia Law 
Review article,67 and Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Southern Pacific 
Co. v. Arizona68 as killing off the "direct/indirect" test.69 
Justice Stone's Di Santo dissent criticized the "direct/indirect" test 
as "too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote 
from actualities, to be of value" and proposed that the Court consider 
"facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its 
function, the character of the business involved and the actual effect 
on the flow of commerce" to decide whether the regulation "concerns 
interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national interest."7o 
Professor Dowling noted that Justice Stone did not explain the nature 
of his proposed factors, that "local concern" and "infringement of 
national interest" are not mutually exclusive, and that the Court 
continued to use the "direct-indirect" test after Di Santo.71 Chief 
Justice Stone's opinion in Southern Pacific articulates a balancing 
approach, based on his Di Santo factors,72 but also sheds more light 
on what he considered to be "local concerns."73 Highway regulation, 
63 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626-27. 
64 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986) (generally striking down statutes that directly regulate or discriminate against interstate 
commerce). 
65 Regan, supra note 45, at 1093--94. 
66 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
67 Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940). 
68 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
69 Regan, supra note 45, at 1094. 
70 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting), overruled by Cali-
fornia v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 (1941). 
71 Dowling, supra note 67, at 7-8. 
72 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945). Interestingly, Chief Justice Stone 
twice cites Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925), for the proposition that states may 
not use their "police power" as an excuse for regulating interstate commerce. Southern Pac., 
325 U.S. at 780-81. Buck was not, however, a balancing case and has been viewed as part of the 
"direct/indirect" line of cases. See infra notes 184-217 and accompanying text. 
73 Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 781. 
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which he considered to be local, was different from railroad regulation 
because highways are built, owned and maintained by the states.74 
The United States Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 
questioned the meaning of the "direct/indirect" distinction and sug-
gested that courts that use the terms "direct" and "indirect" are really 
involved in balancing.75 Some time later, the Court's opinion in Arkan-
sas Electric Cooperative v. Arkansas Public Service Commission 
suggested that the distinction between direct and indirect effects was 
at odds "with the general trend in [the] modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence."76 
Chief Justice Stone did not, however, succeed in eliminating the 
"direct/indirect" language from the dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence.77 In Edgar v. MITE Corp., Justice White, writing a portion 
of the opinion which received only four votes, said that "[t]he Com-
merce Clause . . . permits only incidental regulation of interstate 
74Id. at 783. But see George W. Bush & Sons v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1925) (holding 
that Buck v. Kuykendall not limited to federally funded highways). Chief Justice Stone provided 
other examples of local regulations including "quarantine measures, game laws, and like local 
regulations of rivers, harbors, piers, and docks, with respect to which the state has exceptional 
scope for the exercise of its regulatory power." Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 783. 
75 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Pike opinion, while interpreting 
the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects as a form of balancing, uses the term 
"incidental" without explaining how that term differs from the term "indirect." See id. 
76 Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Arkansas Pub. Servo Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (rejecting 
retail/wholesale bright line which was based upon direct/indirect distinction). The Court has 
repudiated the use of distinctions between direct and indirect effects for purposes of non-dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Al-
though the repudiation of the distinction in one context suggests the possibility that the 
distinction is not viable for dormant Commerce Clause analyses, the distinction is used for 
different purposes in the different contexts. In the non-dormant Commerce Clause context, the 
Court had used the distinction to create a narrow conception of interstate commerce for the 
purpose of limiting congressional power. See id. at 123-25 (rejecting use of "indirect" to define 
extent of federal power). In the dormant Commerce Clause context, the courts have used the 
term "direct" to refer to regulation that was the nearly exclusive domain of the federal govern-
ment and has used the term "indirect" to refer to regulation that might be available to the 
states, if not pre-empted by federal legislation. See Buck, 267 U.S. at 316 (holding that regulation 
of competition to be "peculiarly within the province of the federal action"); Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 240 F.2d 930, 937 (7th Cir. 1957) (discussing "direct" and 
"indirect" regulation and using "indirect" and "incidental" interchangeably). 
77 See, e.g., Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1753 (1995); Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 n.12 (1992); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336, 337 n.14 (1989); 
Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 523 (1989); Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 640, 643 (1982); Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. 
Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 396 (9th Cir.) ("direct" refers to regulations whose central purpose is to 
regulate commerce to benefit local interests), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995); see also Maine 
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (describing statute as restricting trade in the most "direct" 
way possible but also employing "discrimination" language). 
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commerce by the States; direct regulation is prohibited."78 Professor 
Regan, assuming that Justice White could hardly have meant to re-
vive the "direct/indirect" test, argued that the direct/indirect portion 
of the opinion is really about extraterritorial legislation, which Regan 
considers to be a subject apart from the Commerce Clause.79 One year 
after the publication of Regan's article, however, the Court, in Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, held 
that New York's alcoholic beverage pricing scheme directly regulated 
commerce because the effects of the scheme projected New York 
legislation into other states.80 Statutes with extraterritorial effects 
will be subject to heightened scrutiny under the "direct" rationale if 
they apply to, or control, commerce occurring wholly outside of the 
state or if the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct 
beyond the boundaries of the state.81 The practical effect of the meas-
ure will be considered in light of other states' regulatory schemes and 
the effect of other states adopting similar measures.82 Whether the 
"direct" criteria for heightened scrutiny has become limited to extra-
territorial economic regulation is unclear;83 however, even those who 
question the utility of the "direct/indirect" distinction have admitted 
that it seems to retain a place in the current dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.84 
When the Court finds that a statute is neither facially discrimina-
tory, nor discriminatory in its purpose or effect, and its effect on 
commerce is indirect or incidental, it will apply the more flexible Pike 
balancing test.85 This test requires that the court consider the extent 
of the burden, the nature of the local purpose, and the availability of 
78 Edgar, 457 U.S. at 640, 643 (statute was direct regulation because it prevented or inter-
dicted interstate transactions). 
79 Regan, supra note 45, at 1280-81. 
80 476 U.S. at 584. 
81 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336, 337 n.14. 
82 [d. at 336. 
83 Cf id. (factors discussed were the minimum propositions that could be stated from the 
Court's cases concerning extraterritoriality); see also Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecol-
ogy Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995) 
(stating that "direct" refers to regulations whose central purpose is to regulate commerce, 
usually to benefit local interests and that Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), hinged on 
the primary purpose of regulating competition). 
84 See United States v. Delaware, 958 F.2d 555, 559 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (United States Supreme 
Court never fully abandoned direct/indirect distinction); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 
760 F.2d 1408, 1421 (4th Cir.) (declining to hold that Arkansas Electric Coop. v. Arkansas Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 390 (1983), "jettisoned an established analytical framework"), cm. 
denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). 
85 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
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alternatives for achieving that purpose.86 There do not appear to be 
many United States Supreme Court cases since Pike that have used 
the balancing test to invalidate a state statute.87 Even the Pike deci-
sion seems to turn on the Court's suspicions of the state's motives, 
suggesting that the real problem is of an embargo or hoarding nature, 
and shedding some doubt on whether the Pike Court itself used the 
balancing test.88 Even assuming that Pike balancing is a viable part 
of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the relative 
rarity of the Court's reliance on balancing to invalidate state action 
demonstrates that the selection of the appropriate level of scrutiny is 
the crucial issue in dormant Commerce Clause cases.89 
B. Hoarding Products and Natural Resources 
The dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence includes a general 
principle against hoarding of products: states may not "prevent pri-
vately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in inter-
state commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local 
demands or because they are needed by the people of the State."90 
The dormant Commerce Clause also prohibits a state from providing 
its "own inhabitants a preferred right of access . . . to natural re-
sources located within its borders."91 City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey established the basis of dormant Commerce Clause waste cases, 
not merely by holding that "valueless" waste is an article of com-
merce, but also by analyzing landfill capacity as a natural resource.92 
The fact that the natural resource did not move in interstate com-
86 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
87 See generally Regan, supra note 45, § IlI.D (arguing that only Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 
624 (1982), even purports to use balancing and that it has little or no precedental value). Reliance 
upon Pike balancing is probably less unusual in the lower courts. See, e.g., Medigen, Inc. v. Public 
Servo Comm'n, 985 F.2d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 1993); Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South 
Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 843 F. Supp. 100, 109 (D.S.C. 1992). 
88 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145 ("[T]he Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes 
requiring business operations to be perfonned in the home State that could more efficiently be 
perfonned elsewhere."); see also Regan, supra note 45, at 1215-20. 
89 See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408, 1421 (4th Cir.) (if burden is labeled 
"direct" then result is practically foreordained), eert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). But see Maine 
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (upholding Maine's embargo on baitfish because no nondis-
criminatory alternatives available). 
90 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. 
v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (may not hoard for benefit of local businesses). 
91 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). 
92 See id. at 622-23, 627-28. 
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merce was not relevant to the Court's decision to apply long estab-
lished anti-hoarding principles.93 
Several old cases established the basic prohibition against hoarding 
natural resources for local use. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. held 
that a state may not use an embargo to conserve its resources for the 
exclusive use of its inhabitants.94 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia ap-
plied West v. Kansas Natural Gas to regulations that fell short of an 
embargo but provided preferred access to state residents.95 In Fos-
ter-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, Louisiana placed an embargo on 
raw shells or hulls and heads of shrimp because "they are required to 
be manufactured into fertilizer or used for an element in chicken 
feed."96 The Court noted that states may not place an embargo on 
privately owned articles of commerce "on the ground that they are 
required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the 
people of the State."97 In H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du M and, the State of 
New York denied an out-of-state milk distributor a license to open a 
milk collection depot, in part, because the expanded operation would 
reduce the supply of milk available to local markets.98 The United 
States Supreme Court applied Foster-Fountain Packing and held 
that states are without the power to hoard articles of trade.99 
The anti-hoarding principle is not so broad as to preclude all state 
regulation over the exploitation of natural resources. lOO The dormant 
Commerce Clause does not guarantee "residents of one State a right of 
access at 'reasonable' prices to resources located in another State."101 
The states retain the right to control the development and depletion 
of their own resources, so long as they do so in a nondiscriminatory 
manner.102 For example, the Court in City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey assumed that New Jersey could "slow [] the flow of all waste 
93 See id. at 628. 
94 West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 250, 260 (1911). 
95 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 597 (1923) (applying West v. Kansas Natural 
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)). 
96 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1,8-9 (1928). 
97Id. at 10. 
98 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 526, 528-29 (1949). 
99 Id. at 536 (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing, 278 U.S. at 10). The Hood decision also held 
that New York could not deny a permit on the grounds that the milk distribution market in 
upstate New York was already adequately served and that Hood's new plant would result in 
destructive competition. See id. at 529-31. That aspect of the Hood decision is discussed infra 
Section IV. 
100 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619 (1981). 
101Id. 
102 See id. 
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into the State's remaining landfills" as long as it did so without dis-
criminating against imported waste on the basis of its origin. loa A 
state-wide cap is one way of slowing the flow of waste. Unfortunately, 
the dicta in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey does not provide a 
clear answer to the question of what types of state-wide caps are 
consistent with the anti-hoarding principle.104 
A traditional argument in favor of exempting states from the anti-
hoarding principle involves the notion that states have a proprietary 
or ownership interest in wildlife or natural resources within their 
borders.105 For example, Geer v. Connecticut created an exemption 
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny for wild gameY16 This ex-
emption was based on the view that, as representatives of its citizens, 
states may attach conditions, such as forbidding interstate transpor-
tation of game, to the taking of commonly owned property.107 In Hughes 
v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court rejected the "fiction 
of state ownership" and overturned Geer.108 The Court determined 
that the state's interest in conservation was a legitimate local purpose 
similar to its health and safety interests, but that the scope of the 
conservation interest was narrower than the property interest under 
Geer because the state may no longer keep property within its juris-
diction for every purpose.109 New England Power Co. v. New Hamp-
shire involved a challenge to a statute that allowed the New Hampshire 
Public Utilities Commission to prohibit the exportation of hydroelec-
tricity based upon a determination of local need.110 The Court dis-
103 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978). 
104 See id. 
105 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-31 (1896). 
106 See id. at 530-31. 
107 [d. at 530. 
108 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). The Court stated that it had previously 
rejected the Geer analysis when other types of resources were involved. [d. at 329. It then went 
further to describe the Geer doctrine as "a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the impor-
tance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an 
important resource." [d. at 334 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)). 
109 [d. at 337. 
110 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982), challenged N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 374:35 (1995), which provided: 
[d. 
No corporation engaged in the generation of electrical energy by water power shall 
engage in the business of transmitting or conveying the same beyond the confines of 
the state, unless it shall first file notice of its intention so to do with the public utilities 
commission and obtain an order of said commission permitting to engage in such 
business. Any such corporation ... shall discontinue such business ... whenever ... 
the commission shall find that such electrical energy ... is reasonably required for use 
within this state. 
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missed New Hampshire's argument that its ownership of the Con-
necticut River justified the regulation of its use.1l1 "Our cases consis-
tently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution pre-
cludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred 
right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources 
located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom."112 
The market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause 
provides another means for courts to exempt the states from the 
anti-hoarding principle.113 A state acting as a market participant, rather 
than as a regulator of private market participants, is largely immune 
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.114 
In spite of the fairly broad nature of the market participant excep-
tion,115 some question remains about whether the court will allow 
states to use the exception to justify hoarding of natural resources.116 
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the United States Supreme Court distin-
guished South Dakota's local preference policy in selling the output 
from a state-owned cement factory from the practices prohibited in 
the natural resources hoarding cases by noting that "[c]ement is not 
a natural resource."117 The Court went on to observe: 
South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's lime-
stone or other materials used to make cement. Nor has it re-
stricted the ability of private firms or sister States to set up plants 
within its borders. Moreover, petitioner has not suggested that 
South Dakota possesses unique access to the materials needed to 
produce cement. Whatever limits might exist on a State's ability 
111 New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 n.6 (pre-eminent authority to regulate navigable 
waters resides with the federal government). 
112 [d. at 338 (citations omitted). But see Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 
956 (1982) (state's claim to public ownership of ground water may support a limited preference 
for its own citizens). The Court in Sporhase speculated that the measures which applied to 
interstate shipments of water may not have been stricter than limitations placed on intrastate 
transfers under a different provision. See id. The Court also indicated that there were legal 
expectations raised by the Court's equitable apportionment decrees and that the Court's pre-
vious decisions have "recognized the relevance of state boundaries in the allocation of scarce 
water resources." [d. To the extent that Sporhase can be read as ratifying hoarding, it is 
probably limited to claims over ground water. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of 
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 107 (1994). 
113 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976). 
114 See id. "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the 
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to 
favor its own citizens over others." [d. at 810; see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 
(1980) (no constitutional plan to limit ability of states to operate freely in the market). 
115 See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810. 
116 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444. 
117 [d. at 443. 
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to invoke the Alexandria Scrap exemption to hoard resources 
which by happenstance are found there, those limits do not apply 
here.118 
This passage suggests that the market participant exception is not 
absolute, at least where natural resources are concerned, and that 
there may be limits to the states' control over resources found within 
their borders.119 However, as dicta, this passage does not clearly es-
tablish the existence or bounds of those limits.120 
The hoarding cases impose limits on the power of the states to 
ration scarce natural resources.121 A common theme that emerges is 
that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from "isolat[ing 
themselves] from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier 
against the movement of interstate trade."122 Although some of the 
Court's cases have discredited the notion of ownership and proprie-
tary interest,123 there remains a tension between the national market 
goals of the dormant Commerce Clause and a continuing sense that 
the states must retain some power over the rate of exploitation of 
resources located within their jurisdiction.124 Thus, these cases do not 
provide a clear answer to the question of what types of state-wide 
caps on landfill capacity are permissible. 
IV. LOCAL NEED AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. Local Need as a Permit Requirement 
The hoarding cases involve attempts by states to control the ex-
port of articles of commerce that are needed by in-state consum-
118 I d. at 444 (citations omitted). 
119 See id. But cf Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627-28 (1981) (courts 
should not, under the Commerce Clause, inquire into the appropriate level of a facially neutral 
tax on natural resources). 
120 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444. The Master Plan envisions the closure of all existing private 
landfills by the year 2000. MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, ch. 5 app. F. If Massachusetts refuses 
to grant permits to new private landfills, then Massachusetts could be effectively closed to 
out-of-state waste. See id. at 27 (projecting negligible private capacity in the year 2000). The 
question of the limits to the market participant exception imposed by the anti-hoarding princi-
ple, and the ability of states to use the market participant exception to overrule City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978), would become important. 
121 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 628. 
122 See id. 
128 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1979); New England Power Co. v. New 
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 n.6 (1982). 
124 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reI. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); Commonwealth Edison 
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627-28 (1981). 
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ers.125 A different line of dormant Commerce Clause cases deals with 
attempts by states to deny the licensing of new or expanded services 
because they are not needed by in-state consumers.126 Typically, a 
statute will permit or require a state agency to deny a certificate of 
convenience and necessity when a state agency determines that the 
market is adequately served.127 Massachusetts has presented this type 
of rationale, that the Commonwealth is adequately served by the 
existing landfill capacity, as one of the rationales for the Massachu-
setts landfill moratorium.128 
1. Early Development of the "Adequately Served" Case Law 
State governments have used the concept of "public convenience 
and necessity" to regulate commercial activity for over 100 years.129 
The term "convenience and necessity" refers to a variety of state 
interests that are protected through requirements relating to such 
issues as safety, financial responsibility, suitability of character, and 
market conditions.13o For purposes of this discussion, only a particular 
type of market condition is of interest: the requirement that there be 
a demonstration of need for the proposed service or that the market 
is not adequately served. 
The states have long used "demonstration of need" as a permitting 
requirement in the area of local transportation.131 States may also 
require certification of interstate transportation providers and may 
"exclude unnecessary vehicles" on the basis of safety concerns such 
as congestion and wear and tear on the roads.132 However, a state may 
125 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (hoarding 
garbage); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323 (1979) (hoarding minnows). 
126 See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 528--29 (1949); Buck v. Kuykendall, 
267 U.S. 307, 313 (1925). Hood involved both types of issues. The state was concerned that the 
export of milk from the new distribution facility would create milk shortages in Troy, N.Y. Hood, 
336 U.S. at 529. The state was also concerned that the new facility would result in destructive 
competition between distributors. Id. 
127 See, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 258-c (McKinney 1972 and Supp. 1987) ("No license 
shall be denied ... unless the commissioner finds ... that the issuance of the license will tend 
to a destructive competition in a market already adequately served .... "), amended by 1987 
N.Y. Laws ch. 540, § 9 (deleting "destructive competition" and "adequately served" basis for 
denial of permit). 
128 MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 37. 
129 William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Devel-
opments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 426 (1979). 
130 See id. at 427. 
131 See id. at 433-46. 
132 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925); see also C.A. Bradley v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 
289 U.S. 92, 95 (1933) (can deny entry on the basis of congestion). 
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not use adequacy of service as a permit condition for interstate trans-
portation services without violating the dormant Commerce Clause.133 
In Buck v. Kuykendall, the State of Washington refused to grant 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity to an interstate bus 
operator on the grounds that the market the operator sought to enter 
was already adequately served.l34 The State argued that it could 
exclude unnecessary vehicles from its highways, even if those vehicles 
were involved in interstate commerce, in order to promote safety and 
economy.135 Washington argued that the purpose of the statute, "to 
promote good service by excluding unnecessary competing carriers," 
was within its police powers.136 Justice Brandeis, writing for an eight 
to one majority, rejected Washington's argument.137 The state may 
regulate the manner of use of its highways "with a view to safety or 
to conservation of the highways," even if there is an indirect, but not 
unreasonable, burden on interstate commerce.13S The state may not, 
however, prohibit competition in interstate commerce because the 
determination of "the existence of adequate facilities for conducting 
interstate commerce" is "peculiarly within the province of [the] fed-
eral [government]."139 Demonstration of need as a certification re-
quirement was more than merely an indirect burden on interstate 
commerce, and it was, therefore, unnecessary for the Court to inquire 
into whether the burden was "reasonable."140 
Eight years after Buck, Justice Brandeis, in Bradley v. Public 
Utilities Commission, wrote an opinion for a unanimous United States 
Supreme Court upholding the denial of a license to an interstate 
carrier.l41 The State of Ohio could deny a certificate of public conven-
133 Buck, 267 U.S. at 315-16; see also George W. Bush & Sons v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317, 324-25 
(1925) (Buck not limited to federally funded highways or to cases where denial is discretionary); 
Medigen, Inc. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 985 F.2d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1993) (may not deny market 
entry on ground that area already efficiently and adequately served); Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 240 F.2d 930, 940 (7th Cir. 1957) (consent of city to prosecution of 
a business not a valid requirement). But see Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology 
Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 399-400 (9th Cir.) (barriers to entry justified by need 
to prevent "cream-skimming" which could result in discontinuance of service and improper 
disposal of waste), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995). 
134 Buck, 267 U.S. at 313. 




139 Buck, 267 U.S. at 316. 
140 See id. 
141 Bradley v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92, 93, 98 (1933). 
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ience and necessity where the proposed route of service was "so badly 
congested . . . that the addition of the applicant's proposed service 
would create and maintain an excessive and undue hazard .... "142 The 
Court rejected the argument that an interstate carrier was "entitled 
to a certificate as of right" and that the denial of a certificate was a 
per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.143 However, the 
Court reaffirmed the holding in Buck that states may not use ade-
quacy of existing transportation facilities as a criteria for denying a 
certificate.144 In Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a certification statute that allowed the state 
to consider the adequacy of existing services as a factor in denying a 
permit, but did so only because the state had expressly disclaimed 
any right to refuse a permit on that basis.145 Although the Court 
allowed the states to require certificates for the purpose of identifying 
users of the state's highways, it reaffirmed Buck v. Kuykendall and 
indicated that an attempt to enforce the "adequately served" provi-
sion would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.146 
H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond was the first United States Supreme 
Court case to apply Buck outside of the context of interstate trans-
portation.147 In Hood, the State of New York denied an application for 
a license for expanded milk distribution facilities, in part, because the 
farmers in the area were already adequately served by existing facili-
ties.148 New York was also concerned that unregulated competition 
would reduce the volume of milk received at existing plants and would 
increase the cost of handling milk in those plants.149 The Court recog-
142 [d. at 93-94. 
143 [d. at 95. The states may require a certificate and may exclude interstate traffic for safety 
reasons. [d. at 96. 
144 [d. at 95. 
145 Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 161, 163 (1952). 
145 See id. at 161, 163. Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that local regulation of the type 
present in the statute was invalid because it had been pre-empted by Congress when it gave 
the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to regulate interstate contract carriers. [d. at 
166 (Douglas, J., dissenting). However, Justice Douglas also suggested that even as a prelimi-
nary matter, without consideration of pre-emption, the statute was invalid under Buck v. 
Kuykendall. See id. at 165 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
147 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949). 
148 [d. at 529. The statute prohibited the grant of a license unless the commissioner is satisfied 
that the "issuance of the license will not tend to a destructive competition in a market already 
adequately served." [d. at 527 n.3. The Commissioner found that "[t]here [was] no evidence that 
any producer [was] without a market for his milk .... The issuance of a license ... would tend 
to a destructive competition in a market already adequately served." [d. at 529. 
149 [d. at 528-29. 
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nized the intimate connection between the production and distribu-
tion of milk and the public health and welfare.l50 It also recognized the 
"eccentric" nature of the milk industry and the need for and constitu-
tional legitimacy of detailed, intricate, and comprehensive economic 
controls.151 Nonetheless, the Court, citing Buck, declared that: 
[T]he state may not use its admitted powers to protect the health 
and safety of its people as a basis for suppressing competition. In 
Buck v. Kuykendall, the Court struck down a state act because, 
in the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis, "Its primary purpose is 
not regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of the 
highways, but the prohibition of competition." The same argu-
ment here advanced, that limitation of competition would itself 
contribute to safety and conservation, and therefore indirectly 
serve an end permissible to the State, was there declared "not 
sound."152 
The Court did not distinguish between measures aimed at keeping 
milk in the state and keeping additional distribution capacity out of 
the state. Both types of measures represented efforts to directly 
regulate competition in an interstate market for the purpose of pro-
ducing local benefits.l53 And both types of measures were treated as 
per se invalid.1M 
2. The Continued Viability of Buck v. Kuykendall and H. P. Hood 
& Sons v. Du Mond 
Buck and Hood preceded the development of the modern two-
tiered approach to the dormant Commerce Clause.155 Buck is a very 
old decision and Hood was decided by a five to four majority. There 
is, therefore, a legitimate question whether these decisions remain 
good law.l56 
150 [d. at 529. 
151 [d. 
152 Hood, 336 U.S. at 538 (citation omitted). 
153 See id. at 530-31 (restrictions had the "avowed purpose and practical effect of curtailing 
the volume of interstate commerce"); see also Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce 
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 477 (1982) (Hood stands for the proposition that states may 
not use evenhanded regulation designed to achieve valid purpose if regulation attempts to limit 
interstate shipment of goods). 
154 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 565 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Court should have balanced com-
peting interests rather than applying an absolute prohibition). 
155 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
156 See Eule, supra note 153, at 479 (Hood can be criticized for ignoring "evenhanded" analysis, 
for ignoring ''incidental'' analysis, or for failing to employ "balancing" analysis). 
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In 1978 the New York Court of Appeals upheld Section 258-c of 
New York's Agriculture and Markets Law, the same statute that was 
at issue in Hood. 157 New York denied 'fuscan Farms, Inc., a New 
Jersey corporation, an extension of its milk dealers' license into a new 
county because such an extension "would tend to a destructive com-
petition for milk sales in a market already adequately served."158 The 
court distinguished the denial of the permit from the situation in Hood 
by asserting that H. P. Hood was denied its permit in order to protect 
the economic interests of other milk distributors, while 'fuscan Farms 
was denied its permit in order to protect consumers.159 In fact, the 
majority opinion in Hood specifically discussed New York's regulation 
as an attempt to withhold milk from export in order to protect the 
supply of milk for local consumption.160 In spite of the New York 
Court of Appeals' reading of Hood, the United States Supreme Court 
dismissed 'fuscan's appeal for want of a substantial federal question.161 
The Court's decision led Professor Eule to conclude that Tuscan Dairy 
Farms undermined Hood's vitality and to talk of Hood's demise.162 
Tuscan Dairy Farms has not been followed by the federal courts. 
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Board of Agriculture, the United States 
District Court for the District of Hawaii enjoined the state from 
denying a license to distribute milk where the state had denied the 
license on the grounds that "granting the license would tend to pro-
mote destructive or demoralizing competition in a market already 
adequately served."163 The court cited the "adequately served" por-
tion of the Hood decision for the proposition that the dormant Com-
merce Clause prohibits using regulations for the protection of local 
economic interests.164 Three years later, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the application 
157 Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Barber, 380 N.E.2d 179, 188 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 
1040 (1978) (mem.). 
158 Id. at 18I. 
159Id. at 187-88. 
160 See H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949); see also Eule, supra note 153, 
at 478 (Tuscan Dairy Farms fails effectively to distinguish Hood). 
161 Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Barber, 439 U.S. 1040, 1040 (1978) (mem.); see Eule, supra note 
153, at 479. 
162 See Eule, supra note 153, at 479, 48I. 
163 Safeway Stores v. Board of Agric., 590 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Haw. 1984). 
164 Id. at 785. Although the court's opinion stresses its findings that the statute, as enforced, 
displayed discriminatory purpose and effect, the court also noted that there were good reasons 
to invalidate the statute as inherently unconstitutional. Id. at 784--86. The court decided not to 
invalidate the statute out of considerations of comity. Id. at 786. 
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of Section 258, the Hood/Tuscan Dairy Farms statute that denied a 
milk distributor entry into a market that was already adequately 
served, violated the dormant Commerce Clause.165 Without mention-
ing Tuscan Farms, and relying heavily on Hood and Safeway Stores, 
the court said that: 
These cases make clear that even if the Court accepts [the com-
missioner's] contention that excluding Farmland from the market 
is necessary to keep existing producers in business and ensure a 
plentiful supply of milk for New York consumers, denying the 
out-of-state dealer access into the market on that basis is in direct 
conflict with the principles of the commerce clause.166 
Fifteen Supreme Court majority opinions have cited Hood in the 
fifteen years since Professor Eule's announcement of Hood's demise.167 
None of those opinions are critical of Hood's reasoning and none of 
them attempt to narrow Hood's applicability to its facts. 168 Some ele-
ment of Hood, therefore, remains good law. 
In contrast to Hood, only four Supreme Court majority opinions 
have cited Buck v. Kuykendall over the past eighteen years.169 Due 
165 Farmland Dairies v. Commissioner of Dep't of Agric. & Mkts., 650 F. Supp. 939, 944 
(E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
166 Id. 
167 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995); West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 206 & n.21, 207 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. 
Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 366 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 
U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1991); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 
324,326 n.l (1989); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); D.H. Holmes Co. 
v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 29-30 (1988); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 
(1987); Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1986); Northeast 
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); South-
Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnike, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. 
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 
U.S. 648, 652 (1981); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981). 
168 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1335; West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 206 & n.21, 
207; Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 98-99; Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 359, 366; Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 454; Dennis, 498 U.S. at 449-50; Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 326 n.l; 
New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273-74; D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 29-30; CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 
87; Wardair, 477 U.S. at 7--8; Northeast Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 174; South-Central Timber, 467 
U.S. at 87; Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956; Western & S. Life, 451 U.S. at 652; Kassel, 450 U.S. at 
669. 
169 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994); Lewis v. BT Inv. 
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 
(1978); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.19 (1978). The reference to 
Buck in Raymond Motor Transport was unrelated to Buck's central holding. See Raymond 
Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 444 n.19. 
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in large part to the pre-emption effects of the Motor Carrier Act of 
1935,170 more than sixty years have passed since the Supreme Court 
has relied upon Buck to invalidate a state action.l7l Two recent United 
States Court of Appeals decisions have discussed Buck in the context 
of convenience and necessity requirements in waste collection and 
transportation regulations.172 In Medigen, Inc. v. Public Service Com-
mission, the Fourth Circuit appeared to characterize the Buck deci-
sion as relying on the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" 
regulations, a distinction which the Fourth Circuit questioned.173 The 
court avoided articulating what it felt to be an appropriate criteria for 
heightened scrutiny by relying upon the Pike balancing test to invali-
date the denial of a permit.174 
In Kleenwell Biohazard Waste and General Ecology Consultants, 
Inc. v. Nelson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit rejected Kleenwell's argument that Buck establishes a per se 
rule against states requiring a certificate of necessity from any party 
engaged in interstate commerce.175 The court also rejected Kleenwell's 
arguments based on distinctions between "direct" and "indirect" regu-
lation and upheld the statute under the Pike test.176 The court found 
170 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10521-
10531 (1994» (repealed 1995). 
171 Allen v. Galveston Truckline Corp., 289 U.S. 708, 708 (1933) (per curiam), aff'g 2 F. Supp. 
488. 
172 Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 395-97 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995); Medigen, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 985 F.2d 
164, 167 (4th Cir. 1993). 
173 Medigen, 985 F.2d at 166. 
174 See id. at 166-67 (demonstration of need requirement did not serve legitimate state 
purpose in light of other regulatory provisions that regulate prices and require transporters to 
offer services to all). 
175 Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 396. The court cited three cases, TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556 
(1970) (per curiam), Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961), and C.A. Bradley 
v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933), which it said "undermined" the "assertion that Buck 
establishes a per se rule against regulations like the one before us." Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 396. 
Two of these cases rejected a per se rule against certification requirements. See TV Pix, Inc. v. 
Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459, 462-63 (D. Nev.) ("[E]ach case should be viewed on its own facts .... "), 
aff'd per curiam, 396 U.S. 556 (1968); Bradley, 289 U.S. at 95-96 (rejecting claim that carrier is 
"entitled to a certificate as of right"). None of the cases, however, undermine Buck's prohibition 
with regard to adequacy of service as a certification requirement. See Eli Lilly, 366 U.S. at 277 
(state only required applicant to file copy of charter together with limited amount of information 
about operations); Bradley, 289 U.S. at 95-96 (state may not regulate for the purpose of 
preventing undesirable competition); TV Pix, 304 F. Supp. at 463 (state sought only to regulate 
quality of and rates charged for service). 
176 Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 396-98, 400-01. The court indicated that its holding was limited to 
"the general structure and purpose of the regulatory scheme and [did] not consider whether 
the specifics of its operation would withstand constitutional scrutiny." [d. at 399. 
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that the purpose of the statute, "ensuring the safe disposal of solid 
waste in rural areas," was a legitimate state concern,177 and that the 
burden of the regulatory scheme was ''incidental'' and ''insignificant.''l78 
Neither Medigen nor Kleenwell convincingly confirms the continued 
viability of Buck v. Kuykendall because neither case relied upon Buck 
for its holding.179 Neither case, however, suggests that Buck is no 
longer viable. Medigen shies away from expressing any judgment 
about Buck itself.180 Kleenwell appears to reaffirm the continued vi-
ability of Buck, and to merely take issue with the plaintiff's claim of 
a per se right to a permit and the plaintiff's "expansive" interpretation 
of "direct regulation."181 
The United States Supreme Court has not overruled or limited 
Buck or Hood to their facts. There might be some argument that Buck 
is sui generis-that interstate transportation is different because it 
is an instrumentality of interstate commerce.l82 Hood, however, did 
not suggest that Buck initially was limited to transportation or that 
Buck's application to milk processing was an expansion of Buck's 
holding.l83 There is even less reason to view Hood as limited to the 
milk industry. 
177 [d. at 398. 
178 [d. at 399-400. The court did not discuss the availability of less burdensome alternatives 
as part of its balancing process but instead emphasized the fact that the regulations were not 
discriminatory on their face or in their effect. See id. at 400 (benefits outweighed burdens 
because provision burdened in-state and out-of-state companies in the same way and treated 
interstate and intrastate carriers identically). This reasoning is not typical of dormant Com-
merce Clause cases. Discrimination is generally discussed as grounds for heightened scrutiny, 
and is not usually part of Pike balancing. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 
U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (need not resort to Pike test if measure discriminates). 
179 See Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 398, Medigen, Inc. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 985 F.2d 164, 166-67 
(4th Cir. 1993). 
180 Medigen, 985 F.2d at 166. 
181 See Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 396, 397 & n.7 (Buck and progeny hinge on fact that primary 
purpose of regulation was to inhibit undesirable competition). 
182 See TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459, 462 (D. Nev.), afi'd per curiam, 396 U.S. 556 
(1968). 
1&'1 See H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949). Buck has been cited by modern 
United States Supreme Court cases outside of the context of interstate transportation. See C 
& A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) (practical effect of flow control 
on interstate commerce is analogous to law found invalid in Buck V. Kuykendall); Lewis V. BT 
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980) ("Commerce Clause prohibits a State from using its 
regulatory power to protect its own citizens from outside competition."); City of Philadelphia V. 
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by 
state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected."). 
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3. The Modern Meaning of Buck v. Kuykendall and H. P. Hood & 
Sons v. Du Mond 
The initial inquiry in a modern analysis is to determine which level 
of scrutiny the Buck and Hood Courts applied.184 Neither the Buck 
nor Hood opinions contain any language that can be interpreted as 
balancing.185 The thrust of the Buck decision is that the prohibition of 
interstate competition is not a valid purpose because it is "within the 
province of federal action."186 The absence of a valid purpose made it 
unnecessary for the Court to perform a balancing analysis.187 The dissent 
in Hood criticized the majority for conducting "an exercise in absolutes" 
rather than balancing competing interests.188 Both Buck and Hood 
must, therefore, be examples of the application of heightened scrutiny. 
The next inquiry in a modern analysis is whether Buck and Hood 
applied heightened scrutiny because they involved facially discrimi-
natory measures or measures which discriminated in purpose or ef-
fect.189 Buck made its modern reemergence in City of Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey where the Court stated the virtually per se prohibition 
against "simple economic protectionism."190 Buck did not, however, 
involve simple economic protectionism, in the sense of favoring an 
in-state interest over an out-of-state interest, because the permit 
applicant in Buck was an in-state business.191 
184 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 
(1986). 
185 See Regan, supra note 45, at 1266--67 (discussing passages in Hood which might conceivably 
be construed to imply balancing but, he argues, do not). 
186 See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925). The Buck opinion makes use of the 
term ''indirect burden," makes a distinction between "burden" and "obstruction," and fails to 
inquire into the reasonableness of the burden. [d. This suggests that Buck cannot be understood 
as a Pike balancing decision. But see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) 
(asserting that previous balancing decisions have spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" 
effects but not discussing Buck specifically). 
187 See Buck, 267 U.S. at 315-16 (avoiding inquiry into reasonableness of burdens because they 
were "of a different character"). 
188 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 564 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
189 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992). 
190 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (citing Buck, 267 U.S. at 
315-16); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980) (state may not protect 
its own citizens from outside competition) (citing Buck, 267 U.S. at 315-16). 
191 See Buck, 267 U.S. at 313. Although the Court described the statute as prohibiting use by 
some persons, "while permitting it to others for the same purpose and in the same manner," the 
Court's opinion does not suggest that its holding is based on a finding of discriminatory purpose 
or effect. See id. at 315-16. The fact that the permit applicant in Buck was a resident of 
Washington makes any suggestion of discrimination against out-of-state firms in favor of in-state 
competitors somewhat implausible. See id. at 313. 
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The analysis of the role of discrimination is more difficult in Hood 
than in Buck because Hood involved New York's attempt to regulate 
two different types of competition: 1) competition between New York 
consumers and Massachusetts consumers; and 2) competition among 
milk distributors serving New York dairy farmers.192 The attempt to 
hoard milk for the benefit of New York consumers fits the classic 
pattern of discrimination.193 Hood cannot, however, be read as merely 
an anti-hoarding decision because the Court devoted so much effort 
to discussion of New York's "adequately served" rationale for the 
regulation of distributors.l94 It is possible that the Court's analysis of 
the regulation of distributors was based upon an underlying sense 
that New York was discriminating against Hood because it was an 
out-of-state firm.195 The Hood dissent, however, points out that the 
"adequately served" criteria is facially neutral and that there was no 
factual finding of discriminatory purpose.l96 Both Buck and Hood, 
therefore, must be seen as applying heightened scrutiny for some 
reason other than a finding of discrimination.197 
The "direct/indirect" distinction is the only rationale within the 
current jurisprudence, other than discrimination, for applying height-
ened scrutiny.l98 The language in both Buck and Hood is consistent 
192 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 528-29. A significant majority of the Court's recent references to 
Hood have been primarily to articulate broad principles underlying the dormant Commerce 
Clause. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995); Oregon 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1994); Dennis v. Higgins, 
498 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1991); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989); CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 
477 U.S. 1, 7-{3 (1986); Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnike, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984); 
Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981); Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981). Because Hood identified two objec-
tionable practices-hoarding and licensing based on the "adequately served" criteria, 336 U.S. 
at 537-40,-it is not possible to use these cites to free market principles to establish the role of 
discrimination in the Court's analysis. 
193 See Regan, supra note 45, at 1094-95 (defining protectionism in terms of purpose to 
improve competitive position of local actors vis-a-vis foreign competitors through traditional 
instruments such as tariffs, quotas or embargoes). 
194 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 537-40. Even Professor Regan concedes that Hood "could just 
possibly" be read as condemning measures taken with neutral anti-competitive purposes which, 
nonetheless, operate to disadvantage an out-of-state competitor. See Regan, supra note 45, at 
1263. 
195 See Regan, supra note 45, at 1264-65. 
196 Hood, 336 U.S. at 549 (Black, J., dissenting). 
197 See id. at 528-29. 
198 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986). 
1997] LANDFILL MORATORIUM 451 
with this rationale. l99 Yet, some explanation of the sense in which 
these decisions involved "direct" regulation is necessary in order to 
avoid Justice Stone's criticism that the "direct/indirect" distinction is 
too results oriented.20o The Court's opinion in C & A Carbone v. Town 
of Clarkstown can be read as suggesting one possible interpretation 
of Buck as a "directly regulates" decision: that even the evenhanded 
regulation of competition in interstate commerce is not a permissible 
state purpose.201 Hood, however, suggests that not all regulation of 
competition is prohibited.202 The facts of Buck and Hood support a 
199 See Medigen, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 985 F.2d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 1993) (characterizing 
George W. Bush & Sons v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925), Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), 
and C.A. Bradley v. Public U tils Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933), as holding that "direct" regulations 
are per se unconstitutional). Buck talks of indirect burdens and concludes that the "statute is 
a regulation, not of the use of its own highways, but of interstate commerce." Buck, 267 U.S. at 
315-16. The Hood opinion generally avoids the words "direct" and "indirect" and speaks in terms 
of prohibitions on measures which seek economic advantage. See generally Hood, 336 U.S. at 
530-37 (speaking in terms of aiding and protecting and promoting economic advantage). Hood's 
discussion of Buck, however, arguably goes beyond protectionism. See id. at 538 (stating that 
limitation of competition is prohibited even if it achieves permissible ends such as safety and 
conservation); see also id. at 564 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (interpreting majority opinion as 
per se prohibition on regulation of competition). 
200 See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting), overruled by 
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 (1941); cf Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336, 337 
n.14 (1989) (explaining "direct" regulation by expanding on meaning of extraterritoriality). The 
fact that Chief Justice Stone apparently approved of Buck, even though Buck did not involve 
balancing, suggests that he did not view Buck as results driven. See Southern Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 780-81 (1945). 
201 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) (measure which 
does not explicitly regulate interstate commerce may not do so in effect in order to prohibit 
competition); Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 
391, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995) (term "direct" refers to regulation whose 
central purpose is to regulate commerce); Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 
1388 (8th Cir. 1993) (flow control ordinance was "not regulation with a view to safety or to 
conservation ... but the prohibition of competition"); see also Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. 
Michigan Pub. Servo Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 340 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Buck stands 
for the proposition that states may not exclude products or services on the basis of adequacy 
of service). Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of Buck in his dissent in Panhandle stands in 
apparent contradiction to his opinion in Hood. His Panhandle dissent starts with the claim that 
the controversy is not over the instrumentalities of interstate but over the regulation of 
competition. See Panhandle, 341 U.S. at 337 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He proceeds to argue 
that states may not determine what competition they will or will not allow from without, id. at 
339, and then cites the invalidation of regulation based upon convenience and necessity in Buck 
as decisive, id. at 340. Thus, in Justice Frankfurter's view, denial of market entry to a foreign 
purchaser should be subject to balancing, Hood, 336 U.S. at 564, but denial of market entry to 
a foreign supplier is per se invalid, see Panhandle, 341 U.S. at 340 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
202 Hood, 336 U.S. at 530 (approving of regulation of prices so long as effect on interstate 
commerce is incidental) (citing Milk Control Board V. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 350 
(1939». 
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more narrowly drawn formulation of what is prohibited: adequacy of 
service may not be used as a criteria for barring market entry when 
the purchasers in that market are not entirely local.203 
This "adequacy of service to out-of-state purchasers" formulation 
of "direct" regulation is consistent with the representation reinforce-
ment theory of the dormant Commerce Clause.204 According to repre-
sentation theorists, a state can be expected to reach a politically 
acceptable allocation of burdens and benefits among its own residents 
but is not obligated to weigh the interests of out-of-state residents.205 
When a state makes a judgment about whether out-of-state purchas-
ers are adequately served, there is no political process available to 
protect those purchasers.206 In Buck, Washington and Oregon came to 
opposite conclusions about whether the interstate market for passen-
ger transportation was adequately served.207 It is possible that the 
two states merely disagreed in their assessment of the likelihood of 
"destructive competition," and the resulting burdens on passengers 
of either state.208 It seems, however, just as likely that the two states 
shared an understanding that one state's interests would benefit and 
one state's interests would suffer from additional competition.209 Where 
the regulated activity serves interstate purchasers, therefore, at-
tempts to use the "adequately served" criteria should receive height-
ened scrutiny.210 Where the market serves a purely local clientele, 
there is less danger that a state will use the "adequately served" 
203 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 526 (out-of-state distributor was purchaser of milk); Buck v. Kuyken-
dall, 267 U.S. 307, 313 (1925) (out-of-state passengers were purchasers of transportation serv-
ices). 
204 See, e.g., South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938) ("[WJhen 
the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the 
state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are 
normally exerted on legislation."). 
205 See id.; Eule, supra note 153, at 443 (process-oriented protection of representational 
government is the only justification for displacing state regulation). 
206 See Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 185 n.2. 
21Y7 Buck, 267 U.S. at 313. 
208 See id. at 316 (issuance of certificate by Oregon deemed equivalent ofiegislative declaration 
that public convenience and necessity required additional service). 
209 Cf Barnwell Bros., 330 U.S. at 185 n.2. Under the Barnwell analysis, the interests of 
Oregon riders in Buck were not represented by the Washington political process. See id. 
210 See id.; see also Buck, 267 U.S. at 316 (the vice of the legislation was dramatically exposed 
by fact that regulation affected consumers in another state). The representation theory suggests 
that the "adequately served" criteria is presumptively invalid in the context of interstate 
markets, but that the presumption is rebuttable where all states with affected consumers agree 
on the regulatory measure, because all affected consumers will then be politically represented. 
See Barnwell, 330 U.S. at 185 n.2. 
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criterion as a subterfuge to burden out-of-state customers, and the 
Pike balancing test should be employed.211 
The "adequacy of service to out-of-state purchasers" formulation is 
also consistent with some of the case law which deals with regulations 
based upon adequacy of service. In Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & 
General Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson and Medigen, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, the markets being served, generators of 
hazardous waste, were located entirely within the licensing state and 
the statutes were otherwise facially neutra1.212 Therefore, the regula-
tions did not "directly" regulate interstate commerce and the courts 
properly used Pike balancing.213 In Safeway Stores v. Board of Agri-
culture and Farmland Dairies v. Commissioner of N. Y Department 
of Agriculture and Markets, the markets being served, as defined by 
the location of the purchasers, was entirely loca1.214 Both opinions 
contain dicta to the effect that denying market access to out-of-state 
211 Cf Barnwell, 330 U.S. at 185 n.2 (local clientele protected by political process in regulating 
state). This is where Hood does not fit comfortably within the modern jurisprudence. The 
market that was already adequately served in Hood was a purely intrastate market because it 
was comprised of milk producers in up-state New York. See H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 
U.S. 525, 526 & n.1 (1949). Therefore, the adequately served criteria was not facially discrimi-
natory and, according to modern jurisprudence, the Court should have used a balancing ap-
proach. This would have entailed examining the admittedly legitimate state purpose of control-
ling destructive competition in the milk industry in light of the regulatory alternatives available 
to the state. However, the Court performed no such inquiry and probably did invalidate the 
provision on a per se basis. The Court's opinion does not discuss the hoarding and adequately 
served issues separately enough to determine whether it would have conducted some kind of 
balancing inquiry in the absence of hoarding. 
212 Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 392-93 
& n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995); Medigen, Inc. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 985 
F.2d 164, 165-66 (4th Cir. 1993). 
213 See Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 396-97, 399 (rejecting "direct" regulation approach and applying 
Pike); Medigen, 985 F.2d at 166 (applying Pike without expressing an opinion about whether 
regulation was discriminatory). The Kleenwell court said that the waste hauler's claim was 
limited to the argument that the certification requirement was invalid per se under Buck. See 
48 F.3d at 399. The difference in outcome between Medigen and Kleenwell results from the 
different levels of deference the courts accorded the states in evaluating less burdensome 
alternatives under the Pike test. See Kleenwell, 48 F.3d at 399-400 (mentioning regulatory 
provisions including common carrier obligation, safety practices, service territories, and rate 
regulation, but failing to discuss why they were insufficient to achieve universal service without 
additional entry barriers); Medigen, 985 F.2d at 167 (finding that other regulatory tools helped 
insure that universal service is provided and "ruinous" effects of competition were entirely 
speculative). There is also some reason to believe that the Kleenwell decision is outcome 
oriented. The hauler initiated interstate operations, only after it was denied a certificate for 
intrastate operations, as a way of circumventing the regulatory scheme. See Kleenwell, 48 F.3d 
at 393. 
214 Farmland Dairies V. Commissioner of N.Y. State Dep't of Agric. & Mkts., 650 F. Supp. 939, 
941 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Safeway Stores V. Board of Agric., 590 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Haw. 1984). 
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suppliers on the basis of adequacy of service is inherently unconsti-
tutional.215 While this dicta may well be consistent with Hood, it states 
a more severe restriction on state power than is implied by the 
narrower purchaser-oriented formulation.216 According to the pur-
chaser-oriented formulation, heightened scrutiny would not have been 
appropriate in either case, in the absence of a finding of discrimina-
tion. The dicta in these cases suggests, however, that both courts were 
prepared to apply a "directly regulates" rationale and would have 
been even more receptive to an argument in favor of heightened 
scrutiny where the market involved out-of-state purchasers.217 
B. Local Need and the Regulation of Waste 
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether, and 
under what circumstances, a state may require a demonstration of 
in-state need as a condition for approval of a waste processing permit. 
N either has the Court decided the closely related issue of whether a 
state may rely exclusively on in-state need to set state-wide.capacity 
or processing limitations. There are, however, recent lower court 
decisions that address both of these types of measures, and that are, 
therefore, directly relevant to the Massachusetts regulatory scheme. 
1. Conditioning Permits on Demonstration of Local Need 
South Carolina and Georgia have passed waste management stat-
utes that require that waste handling operators demonstrate in-state 
need as a condition for the approval of a permit for new or expanded 
operations.218 The federal courts have held that these requirements 
215 See Farmland, 650 F. Supp. at 944; Safeway, 590 F. Supp. at 784--86. 
216 See Farmland, 650 F. Supp. at 944; Safeway, 590 F. Supp. at 784--86. 
217 See Farmland, 650 F. Supp. at 944; Safeway, 590 F. Supp. at 784--86. 
218 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-96-290(E) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995) provides: 
No permit to construct a new solid waste management facility or to expand an existing 
solid waste management facility may be issued until a demonstration of need is ap-
proved by the department .... In determining if there is a need for new or expanded 
solid waste disposal sites, the department shall not consider solid waste generated in 
jurisdictions not subject to the provisions of a county or regional solid waste manage-
ment plan pursuant to this chapter. 
ld. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-96-290(F) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995) provides: 
In considering a demonstration of need from an applicant to construct a new facility 
prior to adoption and approval of state and county or regional solid waste plans ... the 
department may only consider the amount of waste generated within this State ... . 
In considering a demonstration of need from an applicant to construct an expansion to 
an existing permitted facility prior to adoption and approval of state and county or 
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violate the dormant Commerce Clause; however, these courts have 
disagreed on whether to apply heightened scrutiny or Pike balanc-
ing.219 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina ("HWTC") 
involved the appeal of a temporary injunction issued against South 
Carolina's enforcement of a number of waste regulations, including its 
local need requirement.22o The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit remanded the injunction of the "local need" permit 
requirement, not because of any doubts about the plaintiff's likelihood 
of success, but because the district court had failed to balance the 
hardships to the parties.221 Although the Fourth Circuit disclaimed 
any intention of deciding the constitutionality of the provisions, the 
court suggested that the local need provision would be subject to 
heightened scrutiny because it "appears to be an attempt to block 
South Carolina from the nationwide problem" and "appears not to 
regulate evenhandedly."222 
On remand, the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
and invalidated the local need requirement as facially discrimina-
tory.223 The demonstration of need requirement was an "obvious effort 
to hoard the economic resources of [the] state and to isolate [the] state 
from interstate commerce."224 Once again, South Carolina appealed 
the district court's ruling, arguing that the "demonstration of need" 
requirement was neutral because, once imposed, it applied equally to 
regional solid waste plans ... the department may only consider the amount of waste 
generated within this State. 
Id. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-24(b)(1) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995) provides: 
Id. 
No permit for a biomedical waste thermal treatment technology facility shall be issued 
by the director unless the applicant for such facility demonstrates to the director that 
a need exists for the facility for waste generated in Georgia by showing that there is 
not presently in existence within the state sufficient disposal facilities for biomedical 
waste being generated or expected to be generated within the state. 
219 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1035, 1037-38 
(D.S.C. 1995) (suggesting heightened scrutiny), aff'd, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996); Environmental 
Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534, 1559-u3 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (applying both 
heightened scrutiny and Pike balancing); Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina 
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 843 F. Supp. 100, 109 (D.S.C. 1992) (applying Pike balancing). 
220 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 782, 785 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
221 See id. at 788. 
222Id. at 791 n.14. 
223 Environmental Technologies Council, 901 F. Supp. at 1037-38. 
224 Id. at 1037. 
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in-state and out-of-state shipments.225 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that 
the demonstration of need requirement discriminated in effect by 
making expanded capacity available only where in-state needs dic-
tate.226 
In Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina Department 
of Health and Environmental Control, a landfill operator challenged 
the state's refusal to grant authorization for the importation of out-
of-state waste.227 The South Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1991 ("1991 Act")228 and the Nonhazardous Solid Waste 
Management Planning Regulations ("Regulation 61-100")229 together 
conditioned approval of landfill construction and expansion permits on 
a showing of in-state need. 
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina 
questioned whether the state had the statutory authority to prohibit 
importation of waste from outside a county or region.230 Without rul-
ing on that issue, the court held that the state's implementation of the 
Act and the Regulation violated the dormant Commerce Clause.231 
The court found that the state's application of the 1991 Act and 
Regulation 61-100 discriminated against out-of-region waste; how-
ever, the court applied the Pike balancing test instead of heightened 
scrutiny.232 
225 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 788 (4th Cir. 1996). 
226 See id. 
227 Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 843 
F. Supp. 100, 103-04 (D.S.C. 1992). 
228 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-96--10 to 44-96--460 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995). 
229 S.C. CODE REGS. 61-100 (Supp. 1995) provides: 
Id. 
I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE: 
(A) Because sites suitable for the proper management of solid wastes are limited, 
applicants for permits to establish or expand solid waste management facilities shall 
demonstrate to the Department the need for such new or expanded facilities .... 
(C) No permit to construct a new solid waste management facility or to expand an 
existing solid waste management facility may be issued until the demonstration of need 
is approved by the Department .... 
III. DEMONSTRATION OF NEED REQUIREMENTS: 
(C) For purposes of demonstrating need, waste generated outside the county or 
regional planning area shall not be included unless the Department approves an alter-
nate planning area .... 
230 Northeast Sanitary Landfill, 843 F. Supp. at 107 n.15. 
231Id. at 109. 
232 The court compared two Pike balancing cases, Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan 
Servo Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) and Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 
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The court declined to reach the question of whether the local need 
provision was "facially unconstitutional" because the court was able 
to dispose of the case based on the provision's application to the 
plaintiff's particular circumstances.233 The court did, however, hint at 
the possibility that the "need requirement" might have been difficult 
to defend had the case been decided on the basis of the statute as 
written.234 In an earlier portion of the opinion, the court went out of 
its way to discuss HWTC, in which the Fourth Circuit criticized the 
hazardous waste version of Regulation 61-100 as "an attempt to block 
South Carolina from the nationwide problem."235 The Northeast Sani-
tary Landfill court also suggested that the state's purpose "to protect 
state resources by restricting the flow of waste into South Carolina" 
was illegitimate.236 
In Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that 
a statute requiring permit applicants for biomedical waste thermal 
treatment facilities to demonstrate "Georgia need" violated the Com-
merce Clause.237 The statute required the applicant to show "that 
there is not presently in existence within the state sufficient disposal 
facilities for biomedical waste being generated or expected to be 
generated within the state."238 The court concluded that the statute 
would fail both the heightened scrutiny and Pike balancing tests.239 
The statute received heightened scrutiny because it discriminated 
on its face, in its purpose, and in its effect.240 The court reviewed the 
history of the statute and found that although the stated purpose of 
the statute was to limit the volume of waste handled in-state, the 
statute did not limit or reduce the volume of waste generated in-
state,241 and its passage was motivated by a desire "to restrict the 
941 (11th Cir. 1991), both of which involved county or regional import bans. Northeast Sanitary 
Landfill, 843 F. Supp. at 108-09. 
233 See Northeast Sanitary Landfill, 843 F. Supp. at 109. 
234 See id. (need requirement may well be facially unconstitutional). 
235 See id. at 106 (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 
781, 791 n.14 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
236 Northeast Sanitary Landfill, 843 F. Supp. at 106. 
237 Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
238 See supra note 218 (text of GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8--24(b)(1) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995)). 
239 Environmental Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1558-60. 
240 [d. at 1559. 
241 [d. at 1553-54. The court took notice of the fact that Georgia's regulations were amended 
to allow hospitals to construct additional incineration capacity and accept off-site waste without 
public input or environmental review. This contradicted the purpose of the statute by allowing 
an increase in volume handled in-state. [d. at 1554. 
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influx of biomedical waste from other states."242 The statute discrimi-
nated on its face and in its effect because it blocked disposal of out-
of-state waste "for no reason other than that Georgia's biomedical 
waste generators have no need for the disposal capacity sought."243 
The statute also favored existing Georgia facilities to the detriment 
of any entity that proposed to construct capacity to handle out-of-
state waste and favored existing commercial facilities to the detri-
ment of consumers who would pay the higher prices resulting from a 
restricted supply.244 The "Georgia need" provision was an impermis-
sible "attempt to isolate Georgia from a problem common to the 
several states."245 The court, having decided to apply heightened scru-
tiny, determined that Georgia had shown neither a legitimate local 
purpose nor the absence of reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives, and that the statute, therefore, was unconstitutional.246 
Consistent with the court's heightened scrutiny analysis, the court 
started out its discussion of balancing by finding that the "Georgia 
need" provision did not further the stated purpose of limiting or 
reducing the volume of waste handled in Georgia.247 But the court then 
went further and found that even this stated goal would not benefit 
Georgia "in any legally permissible way."248 The state had not demon-
strated that there would be fewer accidents or an improvement to the 
environment.249 On the other side of the balancing equation, the bur-
den on interstate commerce was not incidental because the proposed 
plant was close to the Alabama border and the plaintiff had attempted 
unsuccessfully to obtain additional capacity at other incinerators.25o 
The court concluded that these burdens were "clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits."251 
242 I d. at 1558. 
243Id. at 1559 (noting that out-of-state generators would not be able to justify expansion of 
capacity but in-state generators would). 
244 Environmental Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1559. Professor Regan has suggested 
that the dormant Commerce Clause only protects competitors from discrimination. See Regan, 
supra note 45, at 1096. In his view, disposal facilities are not in competition with consumers and, 
therefore, a state's decision to favor disposal facilities over consumers is not protectionism 
prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause. See id. 
245 Environmental Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1559. 
246Id. at 1559-60, 1572. The state admitted that it had not considered nondiscriminatory 
alternatives. Id. at 1559. 
247Id. at 1561. 
248 Id. 
249Id. 
250 Environmental Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1561. 
251 I d. at 1563. 
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2. State-Wide Processing Caps 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
heard two cases involving South Carolina's regulation of hazardous 
and non-hazardous waste.252 These cases examined two statutes that 
imposed similar state-wide processing caps based upon in-state de-
mand.253 Although the final outcome of one of the cases is, as of this 
writing, still uncertain,254 the courts appear to have arrived at differ-
ent conclusions concerning the legal effect of basing processing caps 
upon in-state demand.255 The Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. 
Bryant court appeared to suggest that a state could use whatever 
method it wished to calculate a processing cap, so long as the cap 
applied to all waste processors.256 The HWTCIEnvironmental Tech-
nologies Council court appeared to conclude that state-wide caps that 
252 Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252 (4th Cir. 1995); Hazardous 
Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991). 
253 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-60(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995) (creating fluctuating cap 
for hazardous waste) provides: 
During a twelve-month period, the commissioner may allow land disposal by burial 
in excess of the limitation upon certification of the department that: 
(A) disposal by land burial from a particular site in South Carolina is necessary to 
protect the health and safety of the people of this State; or 
(B) at least one hundred ten thousand tons of hazardous waste disposed of by land 
burial in this State during the twelve-month period was generated in South Carolina. 
[d. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-93-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995) (creating fluctuating cap for 
infectious waste) provides: 
[d. 
(A) Beginning November 1, 1990, and annually thereafter, the department shall 
estimate and publish the amount of infectious waste it expects to be generated within 
this State during the succeeding calendar year. No permitted commercial infectious 
waste incinerator facility may burn more than one-twelfth of the annual estimate of 
infectious waste during anyone month of the year to which the estimate applies. 
However, at no time may the limit on the amount of infectious waste burned in a month 
be less than fifteen hundred tons. 
(B) The limitation on the tonnage of infectious waste does not apply to infectious 
waste treated by hospitals or generator facilities if the waste is generated in this State 
and is incinerated on a nonprofit basis. 
(C) For purposes of this section, a permitted commercial infectious waste incinerator 
facility means a site where infectious waste is incinerated regardless of the number of 
incinerator units or the ownership of the units. 
254 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1260 (1995) (remanding to district court for factual findings of 
whether purpose or practical effects of exemptions are discriminatory). 
255 Compare Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 787-88 (1996) 
(cap was not facially neutral but rather discriminatory) with Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258, 1260 
n.11 (cap was not facially discriminatory but may have been discriminatory in its practical 
effect). 
256 See Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258 (method by which cap is established does not burden 
out-of-state waste unequally). 
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are based upon in-state demand are facially discriminatory and are, 
therefore, subject to heightened scrutiny.257 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina involved a 
challenge to several elements of South Carolina's hazardous waste 
management program including a fluctuating state-wide cap on the 
annual volume of waste that can be buried.258 Judge Murnaghan, writ-
ing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
affirmed the lower court's temporary restraining order enjoining en-
forcement of the fluctuating cap.259 After reviewing the challenged 
provisions, the court said that "[t]he challenged aspects ... mayal-
most certainly prove to violate the Commerce Clause."260 The orders 
and statutes were subject to heightened scrutiny, not Pike balancing, 
because they were facially discriminatory.261 On remand, the district 
court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and invali-
dated all of the enjoined measures, including the state-wide cap.262 
In Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, an incinerator 
operator challenged a statute that capped the monthly volume that 
could be treated at a permitted incinerator facility.263 The statutory 
cap used a formula based on an estimate of the volume of in-state 
generated waste.264 The incinerator operator argued that the statute 
should receive "heightened Commerce Clause analysis"265 because 1) 
in-state generators are unaffected by the law; 2) the practical effect 
of the cap is discriminatory; and 3) statements made during legislative 
committee hearings indicate discriminatory purpose.266 Although the 
court was unable to determine which level of scrutiny to apply, it held 
that the statute would not pass the heightened scrutiny test but 
would survive the Pike balancing test.267 
The court initially concluded that the cap did not discriminate on 
its face or in its practical effect.268 "The method by which the level of 
257 See Environmental Technologies Council, 98 F.3d at 787--88 (cap not so neutral as state 
would have court believe). 
258 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 785--86 (4th Cir. 1991). 
259 [d. at 787 & n.9. 
260 [d. at 792. 
261 See id. at 791. 
262 Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1038 (D.S.C. 
1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996). 
263 Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995). 
264 S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-93-21O(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995). 
265 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1257. 
266 [d. at 1258-59. 
267 [d. at 1262. 
268 [d. at 1258. 
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the fluctuating treatment cap imposed by South Carolina is estab-
lished does not place increased burdens on waste based on its ori-
gin."269 The fluctuating cap is no more burdensome to out-of-state 
generators than to in-state-generators and is no more burdensome 
than a flat cap.270 The court concluded that language in HWTC that 
appeared to prohibit references to state of origin271 was not dispositive 
of whether the reference to in-state demand renders a fluctuating cap 
violative of the dormant Commerce Clause.272 The court also examined 
the motives behind the statute, although it made no independent 
analysis of discriminatory purpose and referred exclusively to the 
trial court's findings of fact.273 The court considered the district court's 
findings ambiguous with respect to legislative purpose and remanded 
the question of purpose for further findings.274 
Having disposed of all grounds for heightened scrutiny, the court 
revisited the issue of whether the statute discriminated in its practical 
effect.275 The Chambers facility was the only commercial incinerator 
in the state and was also the only facility treating out-of-state waste.276 
The statutory exemption for non-profit facilities burning in-state waste 
meant, in practical terms, that the cap applied only to the Chambers 
facility and only to out-of-state waste.277 The court concluded that if 
these facts were true, and it had no reason to doubt them, that the 
statute "would appear to be discriminatory in its practical effect."278 
269 [d. 
270 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258. 
271 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(state may preserve capacity by limiting total disposal without reference to whether in-state or 
out-of-state waste is involved). 
272 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258 n.9. The court said that the HWTC decision was unclear about 
which provisions were invalidated and noted that the plaintiff in HWTC had not challenged the 
method by which the cap was established. [d. Finally, the court noted that language in HWTC 
concerning references to out-of-state waste referred to provisions of the Act that gave prefer-
ence to in-state waste disposal. [d. 
273 [d. at 1259--60. The court quoted the following language from the district court opinion: 
"South Carolina, like other states, has attempted to deal with th[e] influx of out-of-state waste 
with legislation which discourages out-of-state waste." [d. (citing Chambers Medical Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. Jarrett, 841 F. Supp. 1402, 1405-07 (D.S.C. 1994), afl'd in part and remanded in 
part by Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995». 
274 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1260. The district court's findings were ambiguous because they could 
be interpreted as finding either that the purpose or the effect of the statute was to discourage 
out-of-state waste. [d. The Fourth Circuit also questioned whether the finding related to a 
discriminatory purpose because such a finding would have triggered heightened scrutiny but 
the district court had not applied heightened scrutiny. [d. 
275 [d. at 1260 n.ll. 
276 See id. 
277 [d. 
278 [d. 
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The court declined to so hold because the state had not been given an 
opportunity to demonstrate a valid purpose and the absence of non-
discriminatory alternatives.279 Later in its opinion, however, the court 
granted the validity of the purposes advanced by the state and then 
concluded that there are nondiscriminatory alternatives that could 
adequately address the state's concerns.280 Thus, while the court re-
manded the case, in part for a determination of legitimate purpose 
and nondiscriminatory alternatives, the court also made its own de-
termination of those matters and concluded that the cap could not be 
upheld if the cap was discriminatory in its purpose, on its face, or in 
its practical effect.281 
Following the Chambers decision, South Carolina continued its appeal 
of the district court's decision in HWTC (now Environmental Tech-
nologies Counci(v. South Carolina) and argued that the state-wide 
cap and demonstration of need requirements were neutral and should 
be upheld.282 South Carolina argued that the statutory language of the 
cap, phrased in strictly numerical terms, and omitting any reference 
to the source of waste, was "an evenhanded neutrallimit."283 The court 
agreed that a state could set an evenhanded cap on capacity.2B4 South 
Carolina's cap was not, however, evenhanded and neutral because it 
could be lifted if necessary to protect South Carolina's citizens or if 
the statutory limit of waste buried was generated in South Carolina.285 
279 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1260 n.l1. The state had, in fact, been given the opportunity to 
demonstrate valid purpose and absence of alternatives. The plaintiff Chambers had directly 
challenged the constitutionality of the fluctuating cap at trial and the state presented arguments 
that the cap was evenhanded. Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Jarrett, 841 F. Supp. 1402, 
1412 (D.S.C. 1994), aff'd in part and remanded in part by Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. 
v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252 (4th Cir. 1995). The state was clearly on notice that it would have to 
show a legitimate state purpose and the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives if the court 
disagreed with it and found the measure to be discriminatory. Even if the state had not been 
given the opportunity to argue purpose and alternatives, the determination of purpose and 
alternatives is a separate inquiry from the determination of discrimination. 
280 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1261. 
281 See id. 
282 Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 782 (4th Cir. 1996). 
South Carolina, apparently relying upon Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258 n.9, initially argued that the 
HWTC opinion had excluded the state-wide cap from the list of provisions enjoined. Judge 
Murnaghan "clarified" his previous opinion in HWTC by indicating that the cap "is included as 
one of the items that violates the Commerce Clause." Environmental Technologies Council, 98 
F.3d at 787 n.20. 
283 See Environmental Technologies Council, 98 F.3d at 787. 
284 [d. (citing Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 345 (1992)). 
285 Environmental Technologies Council, 98 F.3d at 787 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-
60(a)(3)). 
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These exceptions rendered the cap facially discriminatory because the 
exceptions were not granted to out-of-state interests,286 and, like the 
demonstration of need requirement, made expanded capacity avail-
able when needed by in-state, but not out-of-state interests.287 
The Chambers and Environmental Technologies Council courts 
have made similar statements with respect to the viability of facially 
neutral caps.288 These decisions have, however, arrived at different 
definitions of what constitutes a facially neutral cap. For the Cham-
bers court, a cap is facially neutral if, regardless of its derivation, it 
applies equally to all shipments of waste, regardless of their origin.289 
For the Environmental Technologies Council court, a cap is facially 
neutral only if it applies equally to all shipments of waste and it makes 
expanded capacity available to in-state and out-of-state interests on 
an equal basis.290 
v. ANALYSIS 
The Massachusetts landfill moratorium is similar, both in purpose 
and in implementation, to the demonstration of local need require-
ments and the processing caps discussed in HWTC, Environmental 
Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. 
v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Con-
trol, and Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant. This section 
will argue that state-wide waste processing caps based on in-state 
demand should be subject to heightened scrutiny. This conclusion will 
then be used as part of an argument that the Massachusetts regula-
tory scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 
A. Constitutionality of State-Wide Processing Caps 
State-wide waste processing caps based on in-state demand should 
be subject to heightened scrutiny for the following reasons: 1) they 
are inconsistent with Buck v. Kuykendall and its progeny; 2) they are 
286 [d. at 787--88. 
287 See id. 
288 Both Environmental Technologies Council and Chambers rely upon Chemical Waste Man-
agement, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 345 (1992), for the proposition that neutral numerical caps 
are permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause. See Environmental Technologies Coun-
cil, 98 F.3d at 787; Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir. 
1995). Section V.A.4 includes a discussion of whether Chemical Waste Management really 
supports this proposition. See infra notes 330-33 and accompanying text. 
289 See Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258 & n.9, 1260 n.ll. 
290 See Environmental Technologies Council, 98 F.3d at 787--88. 
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logically indistinguishable from the requirement that a permit appli-
cant demonstrate local need; 3) they are inconsistent with basic poli-
cies of the dormant Commerce Clause; and 4) the Chambers decision, 
which holds that state-wide caps are not discriminatory, is unpersua-
sive. The fact that these caps are often implemented in order to 
achieve health and safety objectives does not save them from height-
ened scrutiny.291 
1. Buck v. Kuykendall and State-Wide Caps 
The market for landfill and waste incineration services is an inter-
state market in the sense that the activity being regulated serves 
customers in multiple states.292 The interstate nature of this market 
is clearly distinguishable from the intrastate nature of the market in 
the waste transportation cases, where the regulated activity-collec-
tion and transportation within the state-serviced customers in a 
single state.293 The residence of the service provider is irrelevant for 
purposes of the Buck analysis to the question of whether the market 
is interstate or intrastate.294 
State-wide caps that are derived from projected levels of in-state 
demand are directly analogous to regulations that are based upon an 
assessment of adequacy of service. These caps reflect the regulating 
state's unilateral judgment that a higher level of capacity will not 
serve the interests of the state's residents because the level of the cap 
is sufficient to accommodate the disposal needs of the state's resi-
dents. State-wide caps based exclusively upon in-state demand thus 
fall within the "directly regulates" interpretation of Buck and should 
be subject to heightened scrutiny. 
2. Permit Requirements 
The United States District Courts have invalidated three "demon-
stration of in-state need" statutes, either holding or suggesting that 
they are facially discriminatory and are subject to heightened scru-
291 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978). 
292 Cf Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 313 (1925) (market consisted of consumers in two 
states). 
293 See, e.g., Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 
391, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995); Medigen, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 985 
F.2d 164, 165 (4th Cir. 1993). 
294 Compare Buck, 267 U.S. at 313 (interstate market served by an in-state business) with 
Medigen, 986 F.2d at 165 (intrastate market served by an out-of-state business). 
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tiny.295 The demonstration of need requirement is discriminatory even 
though the requirement does not block the transport of any particular 
quantity of out-of-state waste or prevent any particular waste proc-
essor from devoting its capacity to out-of-state waste.296 The demon-
stration of need requirement governs the process by which states 
authorize the creation of new capacity, not the process by which 
operators allocate capacity to specific generators.297 Similarly, state-
wide caps are concerned with the process by which states create new 
capacity.298 The question, then, is whether a state-wide cap based upon 
in-state demand differs significantly from a demonstration of need 
requirement. If not, then the demonstration of need cases would also 
require that state-wide caps be subject to heightened scrutiny.299 
Under extreme circumstances, a demonstration of need require-
ment and a state-wide cap are equivalent. For example, if there is no 
in-state generation of a particular type of waste, then a permit appli-
cant cannot demonstrate any in-state demand for disposal of that type 
of waste. Both the demonstration of need requirement and the state-
wide cap will prevent an applicant from creating any waste handling 
capacity for use by out-of-state generators. The state will not allow 
the processing of any out-of-state waste. Under these circumstances, 
a demonstration of need requirement is an embargo and is strictly 
forbidden.3°O 
A demonstration of need requirement and a state-wide cap will 
produce equivalent results under less extreme circumstances. If the 
current level of permitted capacity is equal to the current level of 
in-state generation, and all in-state generators have contracts which 
295 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1035, 1037-38 
(D.S.C. 1995) (suggesting heightened scrutiny), a/i'd, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996); Environmental 
Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534, 1559--63 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (applying both 
heightened scrutiny and Pike balancing); Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina 
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 843 F. Supp. 100, 106, 109 (D.S.C. 1992) (applying Pike 
balancing but suggesting that local need requirement "may well be" facially unconstitutional). 
296 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 787-88 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
297 See id. 
29B See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44--5!Hi0(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 44-93-21O(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995). 
299 Cf Environmental Technologies Council, 901 F. Supp. at 1035, 1037-38 (suggesting height-
ened scrutiny); Environmental Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1559--63 (applying both 
heightened scrutiny and Pike balancing); Northeast Sanitary Landfill, 843 F. Supp. at 109 
(applying Pike balancing). 
300 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (finding the state had frozen 
the flow of commerce). 
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are sufficient to handle their anticipated needs, then under either a 
state-wide cap or a demonstration of need requirement, the state will 
allow new capacity to be created to handle new in-state demand but 
not new out-of-state demand. This result demonstrates that, by de-
sign, state-wide caps will treat in-state and out-of-state waste differ-
ently for no reason other than their origin.30l 
Both the demonstration of need requirement and the state-wide 
cap control the creation of new capacity in a way that discriminates 
against out-of-state waste.302 State-wide caps based exclusively upon 
in-state demand are, thus, facially discriminatory according to the 
demonstration of need cases.303 
3. Dormant Commerce Clause Policy 
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court held that an 
embargo of waste is impermissible because it represents an "attempt 
by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by 
erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade."304 From 
the point of view of this policy, is there really any difference between 
an embargo and a state-wide cap? 
A state-wide cap based on an accurate measurement of in-state 
demand makes it possible for a state to handle a volume of waste equal 
to that which it produces. The state will not necessarily be free-load-
ing at the expense of other states. Similarly, an embargo against the 
importation of waste would not necessarily result in a state handling 
less than its fair share. There was, however, no hint in City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey that the Court viewed New Jersey as a free-
301 See id. at 626-27. A state-wide cap would be slightly more flexible than a demonstration 
of need requirement because a cap would always allow new capacity to be created in response 
to the decommissioning of existing capacity, whereas the demonstration of need requirement 
might not. For example, if the decommissioned capacity had been devoted to out-of-state 
generators, then the loss of capacity would not result in unsatisfied in-state demand, and the 
permit applicant would not be able to satisfy the demonstration of need requirement. In any 
event, the cap's slightly greater degree of flexibility does not change the fact that in-state 
generators would have preferred access to new capacity through more lenient permitting 
requirements. See Environmental Technologies Council, 901 F. Supp. at 1035 ("[Blarring con-
sideration of out-of-state market needs and customers in determining whether a facility may be 
built or expanded ... is ... a form of protectionism .... "). 
302 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 787--88 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
303 See id.; Environmental Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1559--63; Northeast Sanitary 
Landfill, 843 F. Supp. at 109. 
304 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 628. 
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loader.305 New Jersey's embargo violated the "anti-isolation" principle 
because the embargo precluded the possibility that New Jersey would 
handle more than its fair share.306 A state-wide cap, no less than an 
embargo, prevents the state from accepting more than its fair share.307 
The fact that such a cap will allow one ton to enter the state for every 
ton that leaves does not make it more consistent with the "anti-isola-
tion" principle.30B 
4. The Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant Decision 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant held that South Caro-
lina's state-wide cap based on in-state demand was not facially dis-
criminatory and that it satisfied the Pike balancing test.309 The court's 
opinion goes to great lengths to avoid invalidating the cap. The opinion's 
analysis of purpose is strained and its reading of the HWTC opinion 
seems less than straightforward.310 According to Buck v. Kuykendall, 
and the cases dealing with the "adequately served" requirement, the 
court should have found the cap to be invalid virtually per se because 
the market being served was not loca1.311 
The Chambers court managed to read ambiguity into the HWTC 
district court's findings by suggesting that the relationship between 
the effect of "discouraging out-of-state waste" and the state's "at-
tempt to deal with thEe] influx of out-of-state waste" did not show dis-
criminatory purpose.312 The court's opinion said the statement could 
be "interpreted as an observation that the legislation enacted has had 
305 The Court focused on the concept of "isolation," and did not suggest that New Jersey was 
trying to take unfair advantage of its neighbors. See id. 
306 See id. at 629. 
Id. 
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary to send 
their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New Jersey claims the right to close its 
borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or 
necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those 
States might then claim the right to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will 
protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts 
by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem 
shared by all. 
307 See id. 
308 See id. 
309 Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1257-58 (4th Cir. 1995). 
310 See id. at 1258 n.9. 
311 See supra notes 184-217 and accompanying text. 
312 See Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1260. 
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the effect of discouraging out-of-state waste,313 an interpretation that 
potentially hurts, rather than helps South Carolina's case."314 This 
explanation is apparently an unsuccessful attempt to paraphrase South 
Carolina's argument that "the State passed a law which has the con-
stitutionally valid effect of discouraging out-of-state as well as in-state 
waste by enacting an even-handed cap."315 The court also adopted 
South Carolina's suggestion that the district court's failure to apply 
heightened scrutiny indicates that the district court did not find a 
discriminatory purpose.316 The district court, however, did not discuss 
the allegation that the purpose of the fluctuating cap was discrimina-
tory.317 The district court concluded that the absence of facial discrimi-
nation was sufficient to avoid heightened scrutiny, a view that would 
explain how the court could have found discriminatory purpose with-
out applying heightened scrutiny.318 The district court's "logic," there-
fore, undermines the Fourth Circuit's strained reading of the findings. 
The Chambers court's interpretation of HWTC is also strained. The 
court quoted language from HWTC to the effect that the state may 
limit total disposal "without reference to whether in-state or out-of-
state waste is actually involved."319 The court then concluded that the 
"without reference to" language was not dispositive of the constitu-
tionality of the cap for three reasons.320 First, the Fourth Circuit said 
it was unclear which of the challenged provisions had been enjoined 
by the HWTC district court.321 The fact that the HWTC Circuit Court 
specifically identified the provision by citing Section 44-56-60(a)(3)(B), 
the section containing the exception for in-state demand, did not stop 
313 [d. 
314 See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (noting that statute 
plainly discouraged full operation of importing facility); cf Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1260 n.ll 
(noting that application of cap to only processor handling out-of-state waste would be discrimi-
natory in practical effect). 
315 See Appellee's Supplemental Cross Brief at 8, Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. 
Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252 (4th Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-1400, 94-1414). 
316 See Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1260; Appellee's Supplemental Cross Brief at 8, Chambers (Nos. 
94-1400, 94-1414) (arguing that either lower court was totally inconsistent or the finding was 
not a finding of fact but merely a passing reference). 
317 See Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Jarrett, 841 F. Supp. 1402, 1412-13 (D.S.C. 
1994), aff'd in part and remanded in part by Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 
52 F.3d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995). 
318 See id. 
319 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258 n.9 (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South 
Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
320 [d. at 1258. 
321 [d. 
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the Chambers court from finding ambiguity.322 Second, the Chambers 
court said that the plaintiff had not challenged the method by which 
the cap was established.323 In fact, the HWTC district court's original 
opinion specifically cites a list of statutes, including the fluctuating 
cap, and then states: "[p ]laintiff argues that the net effect of these 
'protectionist' laws is that they are having the effect of interfering 
with the free flow of interstate commerce."324 It is not clear how the 
Chambers court could have read this list as not including the method 
by which the cap was computed. Moreover, on remand, the HWTC 
(Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina) district court 
invalidated the cap, an unlikely result if it had not been challenged.325 
Third, the Chambers court said that the context of the "without 
reference to" language related to provisions of the statute that gave 
preference to in-state waste disposal, rather than to the fluctuating 
cap.326It is true that the paragraph containing the "without reference 
to" language does not specifically mention the fluctuating cap.327 The 
fluctuating cap, however, can easily be seen as a measure that gives 
preference to in-state waste because the cap makes additional capac-
ity available only when there is additional in-state demand. 
Finally, the court avoided heightened scrutiny by holding that the 
fluctuating cap was facially neutral and not discriminatory in effect.328 
According to the court, the state is free to set a cap at whatever level 
the state likes, so long as the authorized capacity is made available on 
a non-discriminatory basis.329 The idea that the state can set a cap at 
whatever level it likes appears to come from two places. The first 
source for this idea appears to be the Chambers lower court citation 
to Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, for the proposition 
that states may apply an even-handed cap.330 What Chemical Waste 
Management really said was that: 
322 See id. 
323 [d. at 1259 n.9. 
324 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431, 437-38, aff'd in 
part and remanded in part by 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991). 
325 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1036-37 
(D.S.C. 1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996). 
326 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258. 
327 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792 (4th Cir. 1991). 
328 Chambers, 52 F.3d at 1258. 
329 [d. 
330 See Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Jarrett, 841 F. Supp. 1402, 1412 (D.S.C. 1994) 
(citing Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1992)), aff'd in part 
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[u]ltimately, the State's concern focuses on the volume of the 
waste entering the Emelle facility. Less discriminatory alterna-
tives, however, are available to alleviate this concern, not the least 
of which are a generally applicable per-ton additional fee on all 
hazardous waste disposed of within Alabama, or a per-mile tax on 
all vehicles transporting hazardous waste across Alabama roads, 
or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage landfilled at Emelle.331 
This passage supports the certification of a maximum capacity at a 
particular facility but says absolutely nothing about state-wide caps 
at either fixed or fluctuating levels.332 Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources and City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey contain statements apparently approving of 
neutral caps; however, neither case actually involved the constitution-
ality of a state-wide cap.333 
The second possible source for this idea comes from a footnote in 
the Fourth Circuit opinion in HWTC.334 The HWTC court cited the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA) Section 104(c)(9)335 as authorizing states to refuse 
to sign interstate agreements.336 This section of CERCLA sets out 
conditions a state must meet in order for the federal government to 
provide remedial action in that state.337 These conditions do not, how-
ever, authorize the states to regulate interstate commerce in a way 
that would otherwise be unconstitutional. 338 The HWTC court finally 
concluded that CERCLA Section 104(c)(9) does not authorize a state 
to limit its actual in-state capacity to in-state waste.339 Thus, the Cham-
bers courts have misapplied Chemical Waste Management, HWTC, 
and possibly CERCLA and have provided no appropriate precedents 
and remanded in part by Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1255 
(4th Cir. 1995). 
331 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1992) (emphasis added) 
(citations and footnote omitted). 
332 See id. Environmental Technologies Council mischaracterizes Chemical Waste Manage-
ment in exactly the same way. Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 
774,787 (4th Cir. 1996). 
333 Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 
367 (1992) (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978». 
334 See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792 n.15 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
335 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988). 
336 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 792 n.15. 
337 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9). 
338 See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 795 ("RCRA and CERCLA 
§ 104(c)(9) do not appear to evince congressional intent to redefine the Commerce Clause."). 
339 [d. 
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in support of, or policy justifications in favor of, facially neutral state-
wide caps. 
There are good reasons to be suspicious of apparently neutral state-
wide caps. First, state-wide caps are essentially import quotas be-
cause the maximum amount of waste that can be imported into the 
state is equal to the state-regulated capacity.340 Therefore, state-wide 
caps allow the states to circumvent the constitutional prohibition 
against setting import quotas.341 Second, state-wide caps, to the ex-
tent that they result in a reduction of imports, are essentially at-
tempts to isolate the states from the economic problems of the nation.342 
By setting the cap equal to the level of waste generated in-state, the 
state can determine, by legislative fiat, that it will have no net im-
ports. There is little practical difference between this type of cap 
and permitting states to isolate themselves by prohibiting imports.343 
Third, while the level of the cap will inevitably change from time to 
time to accommodate changes in local demand, it is unrealistic to 
expect that a state which has imposed a cap will increase that cap in 
order to accommodate a neighboring state.344 The process by which 
changes will be made to a neutral cap will, due to political pressures, 
be equivalent to a fluctuating cap defined in terms of in-state de-
mand.345 
Even assuming that neutral caps are constitutional, the Chambers 
court did not really explain how that assumption leads to its conclu-
sion that in-state need-based caps are facially neutra1.346 When a waste 
generator in a fluctuating cap state needs to find additional disposal 
capacity, it can look to neighboring states or it can try to convince its 
own state to allocate more capacity to an existing or new operator.347 
Presumably, if the generator chooses the latter route, there are ways 
340 The fact that the theoretical limit on imports may often, but not always, be very large is 
not relevant to the issue of whether it is a quota or whether quotas are constitutional. See City 
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (attempt to erect a barrier is crucial 
issue). 
341 See id. 
342 See id. 
343 See id. 
344 See South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938). 
345 See id. 
346 Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir. 1995) (asserting 
that burdens on in-state and out-of-state are the same without discussing difference in effect 
on capacity resulting from increase in in-state, but not out-of-state, demand). 
347 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 787-88 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
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that it can ensure that it gains access to the newly available capacity, 
for example through contractual arrangements entered into with the 
permit applicant. On the other hand, if an out-of-state generator needs 
additional capacity, it will not have the option of getting more capacity 
allocated in the cap state.348 Fluctuating caps, therefore, provide in-
state interests with preferential access to a natural resource in viola-
tion of the anti-hoarding principle.349 
The Chambers holding that the fluctuating cap should not be sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny is not supported by the Buck v. Kuyken-
dallline of cases.350 The reasoning of the case is unpersuasive and the 
opinion itself is internally inconsistent. The Chambers opinion should 
be viewed as inconsistent with both the older case law dealing with 
the "adequately served" regulations in generaP51 and the newer case 
law dealing with "demonstration of need" in waste cases in particular.352 
B. Application to the Massachusetts Permit Moratorium 
The analysis of the Massachusetts scheme starts with the selection 
of the standard of scrutiny: heightened scrutiny or Pike balancing. 
There are three reasons the Massachusetts scheme should receive 
heightened scrutiny: 1) the process for granting permits closely re-
sembles the "demonstration of need" provisions declared invalid in 
the South Carolina and Georgia cases;353 2) the moratorium is equiva-
lent to a state-wide cap based upon in-state demand;354 and 3) there is 
a strong argument that provisions of the Master Plan demonstrate 
discriminatory purpose or effect.355 
The Massachusetts regulatory scheme includes a "demonstration of 
need" requirement which is similar to the "demonstration of need" 
348 See id. 
349 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 628. 
350 See supra notes 184-217 and accompanying text. 
351 See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,538-40 (1949); Buck v. Kuykendall, 
267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925). 
352 See, e.g., Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1035, 
1037--38 (D. S.C. 1995), aiI'd, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996); Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. 
v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534, 1559-63 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South 
Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 843 F. Supp. 100, 109 (D.S.C. 1992). 
353 See Environmental Technologies Council, 901 F. Supp. at 1035, 1037--38; Environmental 
Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1559-63; Northeast Sanitary Landfill, 843 F. Supp. at 109. 
354 See supra Section V.A. 
355 See Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1260 n.ll (4th Cir. 1995) 
(considering possibility that exception for in-state generators renders scheme discriminatory). 
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requirements in Georgia356 and South Carolina.357 Massachusetts makes 
a factual determination of the level of in-state need and allocates 
permits until that need is satisfied.358 Once the deemed level of need 
is allocated, it is unlikely that the state will grant approval to an 
operator who wants to develop more capacity to serve an out-of-state 
generator.359 This process closely resembles the "demonstration of 
need" requirements that were struck down in South Carolina and 
Georgia.360 Those cases strongly suggest that the Massachusetts per-
mitting process is virtually per se invalid.361 
According to the Massachusetts Solid Waste Master Plan, the landfill 
moratorium represents little more than an attempt to clarify the 
Commonwealth's previous position: the Commonwealth is not recep-
tive to new landfill projects because the market is adequately, or 
more than adequately, served by existing capacity.362 The regulatory 
scheme, of which the moratorium is a part, is in essence, a state-wide 
processing cap that is designed to decrease over time.363 The Massa-
chusetts processing cap is similar to the South Carolina caps in the 
sense that only Massachusetts demand is considered in setting the 
level of the cap364 and the moratorium will not apply to certain actions 
that probably apply only to Massachusetts generators.365 
According to Buck's treatment of the adequately served require-
ment, the only way to avoid heightened scrutiny would be to argue 
that the market is not an interstate market.366 As was the case with 
South Carolina, the market that Massachusetts is attempting to regu-
356 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-24(b)(1) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995). 
357 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44--56-60(a)(3), -96-290(E)-(F) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995). 
358 See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 39-40. 
359 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 19.038(2)(a) (1995). 
360 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1035, 1037-38 
(D.S.C. 1995) (suggesting heightened scrutiny), aff'd, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996); Environmental 
Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534, 1559-63 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (applying both 
heightened scrutiny and Pike balancing). 
361 See Environmental Technologies Council, 901 F. Supp. at 1035, 1037-38; Environmental 
Waste Reductions, 887 F. Supp. at 1559-63; Northeast Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. South Carolina 
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 843 F. Supp. 100, 109 (D.S.C. 1992). 
362 See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 38. 
363 See id. at 27. 
364 See id. at 30 (Table 3-1 item 1). 
365 See id. at 36 (exception for imminent threat to public health, safety, or environment 
presumably does not apply to threats outside of the state). 
366 See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 313 (1925) (market consisted of consumers in two 
states). 
474 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:2 
late is an interstate market because it serves both in-state and out-
of-state generators.367 Massachusetts might argue that the market is 
not an interstate market because Congress has required the states to 
plan for disposal capacity which is sufficient to provide for the states' 
own needs; however, the courts have rejected this argument.368 A 
major difference between the Massachusetts and South Carolina regu-
latory schemes is that Massachusetts does not attempt to explicitly 
reserve capacity for in-state generators.369 The reasoning in Hazard-
ous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina and the argument in 
Section V.A of this Comment, however, do not depend on the presence 
of other discriminatory measures.370 A state-wide cap based exclu-
sively upon in-state demand, even absent other discriminatory meas-
ures, should still be virtually per se invalid. 
The scheme also suffers from a discriminatory purpose. There are 
three legitimate purposes that are achieved by the scheme: reducing 
an undesirable land use; creating incentives for generators to reduce 
their dependence on landfill disposal and increase their use of recy-
cling; and creating an economic environment in which recycling indus-
tries can grow and develop new technology.371 The scheme is also 
intended to ensure that Massachusetts does not become a significant 
net importer of solid waste.372 The Master Plan states this as an 
assumption, rather than as an objective; however, no other outcome 
is mathematically possible and thus, control of imports should be 
viewed as one of the scheme's design goals.373 The fact that the Master 
Plan is designed to limit imports is also revealed by a comment in the 
367 See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 3 (net imports in 1994 amounted to 3.8% of total solid 
waste disposal). 
368 See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 795 (4th Cir. 1991) 
("RCRA and CERCLA § 104(c)(9) do not appear to evince congressional intent to redefine the 
Commerce Clause."); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,409-10 
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (RCRA does not authorize otherwise unconstitutional flow 
control measures). 
369 It is unclear whether the selection criteria for competing proposals for new capacity 
effectively reserves capacity for in-state generators through the requirement that the project 
promote the integrated solid waste management objectives. See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, 
at 40. One of the assumptions of the Solid Waste Management Plan is that Massachusetts will 
be a zero net importer of solid waste. Id. at 30. Presumably, a project that could compromise 
that assumption by importing large amounts of waste would not be considered to promote the 
solid waste management objectives. 
370 See Environmental Technologies Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774, 787-88 (4th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting fluctuating cap without reference to other provisions). 
371 See MASTER PLAN; supra note 3, at 36-38. 
372 See id. at 37. 
373 See id. at 30. 
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Master Plan which notes that one of the undesirable consequences of 
permitting additional landfill capacity would be increased waste im-
portS.374 Thus, a purpose, not an assumption, of the scheme is to limit 
imports by enforcing a form of reciprocity in which the Common-
wealth will only allow imports from other states if other states accept 
an equal amount of waste from the Commonwealth.375 
There are other indications of discriminatory purpose. The Master 
Plan contains a theoretical exception to the moratorium which allows 
the state-wide cap to be exceeded if there is a showing of exceptional 
hardship within a project proponent's service area.376 This exception 
does not appear to be available to applicants seeking to serve out-of-
state generators. With regard to criteria for site assignment, the 
Master Plan describes a site selection process which would give priority 
to proposed facilities which make a "contribution to state-wide or 
regional integrated solid waste management goals."377 This strongly 
suggests that an applicant who is seeking to serve an out-of-state 
generator is not likely to fare well in the selection process. These 
provisions, the Master Plan's attitude toward imports, and the fact 
that the scheme is guaranteed to prevent substantial net imports, 
should be sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory purpose. 
In order to uphold the scheme under heightened scrutiny, the Com-
monwealth must be able to show that there are no non-discrimina-
tory alternatives that serve legitimate state purposes.378 In this case, 
there appear to be several nondiscriminatory alternatives. The cur-
rent scheme is predicated in large part on the theory that a forced 
reduction in supply will directly result in a reduction in landfill use 
and will indirectly result in increased prices, which in turn will result 
in greater incentives for municipalities to adopt recycling programs.379 
The increase in recycling will, in turn, result in an improved economic 
environment for recycling industries.380 The most obvious alternative 
available is a nondiscriminatory tax on landfill use. A tax would dis-
courage both in-state and out-of-state generators from using Massa-
374 See id. at 37. 
376 See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 791 (4th Cir.1991) 
(citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), for the proposition that reciprocity 
provisions are unconstitutional even where public health justification is asserted). 
376 See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 44. 
377 See id. at 45. 
378 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
379 See MASTER PLAN, supra note 3, at 37. 
380 See id. 
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chusetts landfills, and would encourage municipalities to adopt recy-
cling. Another alternative would be to mandate recycling programs 
on municipalities. This approach would decrease the in-state demand 
but might also cause a decrease in unregulated landfill prices, result-
ing in an increase in imports. This effect could be prevented by com-
bining the mandatory recycling approach with the tax approach. The 
presence of nondiscriminatory alternatives requires that the Massa-
chusetts landfill regulatory scheme be invalidated.381 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Buck v. Kuykendall line of cases establishes a strong presump-
tion against regulation of interstate markets based on adequacy of 
service, where the regulating state refuses to consider out-of-state 
needs. The Massachusetts landfill moratorium is just such a measure. 
It appears to be facially neutral because it applies to all landfills, 
regardless of whether they handle in-state or out-of-state waste. How-
ever, the refusal to accommodate out-of-state demand in the compu-
tation of market need makes the regulatory scheme facially discrimi-
natory. Because there are nondiscriminatory alternatives that will 
serve Massachusetts's legitimate purposes, the landfill moratorium 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. Massachusetts may regulate solid waste in order to achieve its 
goals; however, it may not do so by creating a local market and 
isolating itself from the national economy. 
The Massachusetts solid waste regulatory scheme is a well-inten-
tioned attempt at solving a pressing environmental problem. It is 
possible that the most effective approaches for solid waste manage-
ment will require that the states be free to regulate solid waste 
disposal as a local market. This possibility makes the judicial invali-
dation of the Massachusetts moratorium an unattractive prospect. 
The courts should not, however, shy away from upholding the princi-
ples behind the dormant Commerce Clause by allowing the states to 
"go it alone" and isolate themselves from each other. "It is easy to mock 
or minimize the significance of 'free trade among the states' .... It is 
true of this principle, as of others, that the principle is not to be reduced 
to the appeal of the particular instance in which it is invoked."382 
381 See Chambers Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1261 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(suggesting that measure would fail heightened scrutiny because nondiscriminatory measures 
were available). 
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(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
